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Abstract
This thesis investigates why, in spite of the high tax and opportunity costs, a substantial
fraction of workers withdraw money from their employer-sponsored retirement accounts
upon leaving a job. I employ three national surveys–the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth 1979 (NLSY79), the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and the Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP)–to evaluate explanations for this behavior.
Often attributed to poor decision-making, withdrawals from employer-sponsored plans
may in fact serve as an important mechanism for liquidity-constrained workers to smooth
consumption in response to income shocks. Results from the NLSY79 suggest that
withdrawals do appear to be driven largely by need, as workers who faced jobless spells
upon separation as well as those with low holdings of liquid assets, and poor access to
consumer credit markets, were significantly more likely to take some money from their
retirement plans when leaving an employer. Yet there was little evidence to support the
hypothesis that workers who suffered an adverse job separation were more likely to
withdraw money from their plans if they were also liquidity constrained.
The second chapter estimates the tax sensitivity of withdrawal decisions using estimates
of effective federal and state marginal tax rates generated with the NBER Taxsim
program. Estimates reveal that, depending on the tax price measure used, a one percent
increase in the marginal tax rate increased the probability that workers preserved the
tax-deferred status of the money in their retirement plans between 10 and 30 percentage
points. State-level penalties for early withdrawals were also found to be an effective policy
instrument for deterring cash outs among workers under age 55.
ii
In the third chapter, I take advantage of measures of savings goals and habits, as well as
more specific information on the use of cash settlements, found in the SCF to further
investigate behavioral explanations for disposition of employer-sponsored plans. Workers
who reported credit constraints, a short planning horizon, not saving primarily for
retirement and a major future expense for which they had not yet begun saving were
significantly more likely to take money from their plans.
iii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation investigates why, in spite of high tax and opportunity costs, a substantial
fraction of workers withdraw money from their employer-sponsored retirement accounts
when leaving a job. For many workers, this cost can run as high as 30 to 40 percent of
their distribution. Because of these costs, cash outs are often regarded as irrational or poor
decisions by workers.
I use three national data sets to gain three different perspectives on this issue. In the
first chapter, I use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to investigate the
influence of income risk and liquidity constraints on the withdrawal decision. In the second
chapter, I use the Survey of Consumer Finances to look at how households’ financial
attitudes, preferences and other expectations are related to the cash out decision. Lastly,
with data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, I analyze the effect of tax
prices on the likelihood that workers take money from their plan.
The aim of my first chapter is to explore whether some combination of income risk and
liquidity constraints can account for the high cash out rate. Cash outs might be justified,
for instance, if workers have both a need for liquidity, due for instance to an income shock
associated with the job separation itself, and lack the liquid assets necessary to meet that
need.
I find that workers who have not secured another job at separation are significantly more
likely to take money from their plans, as are those with meager liquid assets holdings, poor
access to credit and gaps in their health insurance coverage. These findings suggest that
cash outs may be driven more by legitimate need, and less by frivolous spending, than
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commonly thought. The strong association of cash outs with uncertain job status at
separation is particularly troubling, given the high proportion of workers who do not
immediately transition to another job upon separation.
However, to test my main hypothesis, namely that cash outs are driven largely by
liquidity-constrained workers attempting to smooth consumption in response to an income
shock, I estimate the interaction effect between job status at separation and liquidity
constraints. I do not find conclusive evidence that this interaction effect is strongly positive,
as one would expect to find if the above hypothesis held true. While the absence of a
positive interaction effect may be due to some data limitations, it may also suggest that
precautionary motives play a role in the cash out decision; in other words, workers may be
using the opportunity to convert their retirement savings into more liquid asset holdings.
In addition, I test how responsive workers are to the tax price by taking advantage of the
fact that workers who are left jobless earlier in the calendar year are more likely to record
lower earnings for that tax year compared to those who were left jobless late in the year,
whose incomes have been largely determined for that tax year. Here I find a significant
positive interaction between early separations and not having another job lined
up–evidence that even workers who are initially unemployed at separation are responding
to tax price incentives.
In my second chapter, I use the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and
TAXSIM program, provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), to
more rigorously analyze the tax price sensitivity of the cash out decision. Using methods
to that address the endogeneity of the tax price, I find that the tax price significantly
increases the likelihood that workers preserve the tax-deferred status of their pension
savings. In the first case I use the first-dollar tax rate–that is, the rate net of any
distribution taken–as a proxy for the actual tax price. I also use an instrumental variables
approach, using the first-dollar rate as an instrument for the actual rate. Another
instrument that I employ is the quarter of separation, the rationale being that, again,
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workers who leave a job should be more likely to record lower earnings for that tax year.
The quarter of separation is a valid instrument in that it is unlikely to be correlated with
the error term in the withdrawal equation; however, it is a rather weak instrument. The
first-dollar rate, on the other hand, is a strong instrument but its validity in terms of being
uncorrelated with the error term is more questionable.
I also cull information on state-level early withdrawal penalties to separately estimate
their effect on the probability that workers preserve the tax-deferred status of their
retirement savings. Even controlling for the tax price, the existence of a state level penalty
has a significant deterrent effect, which suggests some scope for states to influence the
disposition of retirement plan balances if they see this as a desirably policy aim.
The third chapter uses the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to explore how
retirement plan participants’ heterogeneous financial attitudes and behaviors are reflected
in the disposition of their employer-sponsored plans at job separation. The dramatic shift
from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) plans offered by employers has also
entailed an shift in the responsibility for plan management from employer to employee. In
a sense, participants in DC plans have had to become their own financial planners. There
is some concern, however, that some participants are not in a position to cope well with
the increased decision-making burden. Because DC plans have generally allowed
participants to take money from their plans at job separation, whereas DB plans generally
have not, these participants are at risk of depleting their retirement savings before they
ever reach retirement. This risk has been particularly high in the absence, until recently, of
default options that encourage participants to either keep the money in their former
employer’s plan to accumulate or to transfer the money to another tax-deferred account.
Cluster analysis is used to generate four distinct segments, or financial personality types,
of retirement plan participants. These segments range from “successful planners,” who
exhibit desirable financial attitudes and behaviors, to “acute strugglers,” whose attitudes
and behaviors do not comport well with the model of sound plan management. Some of
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the key dimension along which these types differ include their financial planning horizon,
financial risk tolerance, savings goals and habits, credit card behaviors and effort put into
researching financial decisions.
The results point to segments of the participant population at considerably higher risk
for depleting at least some portion of their retirement savings at job separation. Further,
analysis of the specific uses to which these withdrawals are put reveal that current
consumption and the need to pay off debt are driving these cash outs. An encouraging
finding is a majority of participants exhibit fairly desirable financial attitudes and
behaviors and cash out at a much lower rate.
Another result of interest is the effect of participants’ subjective expectations of future
movements in real income. Not surprisingly, those anticipating real income growth are
significantly less likely to cash out. Encouragingly, however, those expecting a decline in
real income appear not to be giving in to the temptation to use their settlements for
current consumption. The presence of borrowing constraints–a measure derived using a
nearly identical set of questions to those found in the NLSY–failed to yield any significant
effects in this study. Part of the reason for this may lie in the richer set of preference as
well as other credit-related variables included in the models for this study.
The findings in this chapter highlight the independent effect of financial attitudes and
behaviors on the cash out decision, even when controlling for the typical determinants of
life-cycle savings, income uncertainty, asset holdings and subjective expectations. They
also raise questions about how well the “struggler” types are served by DC plans if they
are likely to deplete a substantial portion of their plan assets before reaching retirement.
Lastly, this chapter points to the need to identify these at-risk participants and to move
them, through financial and retirement planning education, from “strugglers to “successful
planners.” At-risk participants may also benefit considerably from appropriate default
options for the disposition of their plans at job separation.
In sum, this dissertation updates and expands the current state of knowledge on what
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workers do with their employer-sponsored retirement plans when leaving a job. It provides
a more nuanced picture of who is cashing out and why. In particular, it illuminates a
number of factors that have received scant, or no, attention in the previous literature.
First, it sheds new light on the extent to which cash outs are driven by financial distress
and adverse job separations. Second, it provides evidence, using both a tax price analysis
and a novel source of variation based on the quarter of job separation, that workers are
indeed rather sensitive to the tax price of a cash out. Lastly, it identifies attitudinal and
behavioral types who are particularly vulnerable to depleting their retirement savings and,
further for what purpose the are most likely to cash out. The results from this research are
timely, given the recent turmoil in the financial and labor markets, and relevant to what
appears to a looming crisis in retirement income security.
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Chapter 2
The Effect of Credit Constraints and
Income Risk on Early Withdrawals
2.1 Introduction
Previous research has consistently found that a substantial fraction of workers take money
from their employer-sponsored retirement savings plans (ESPs) when changing jobs. This
behavior has been difficult to reconcile, however, with the high price workers pay to take
early withdrawals from these plans. In addition to the federal, and possibly state, income
taxes due on any distribution from an ESP, departing workers under the age of 55 incur a
ten percent excise tax on distributions not transferred to another tax-qualified plan within
60 days. Moreover, a withholding tax on distributions, introduced in 1993, means that
workers will initially receive only 80 percent of the amount withdrawn, with the remaining
20 percent serving as a down payment on their future tax obligation.1 Yet the most
significant cost workers are likely to incur by taking an early withdrawal is the years of
forgone tax-deferred earnings.
Why so many workers take money from their ESPs when leaving a job–in spite of the
cost–is still not well understood. One view is that these workers are making poor decisions,
resulting from a lack of willpower, a lack of knowledge, or both. From a behavioral
perspective, for instance, the opportunity to receive a large lump-sum payout when leaving
a job represents a temptation difficult for many workers to resist. It is on this view,
presumably, that the punitive tax to discourage pre-retirement withdrawals is justified.
1This withholding tax does not actually increase the worker’s tax burden but does delay receipt of that
portion of distribution until the worker’s next tax return. There is a cost to workers insofar as the withheld
amount represents a non-interest-bearing loan to the government.
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Early withdrawals may also be due to bounded rationality. It has been shown, for
instance, that individuals commonly underestimate the power of tax-deferred
compounding, an error that would lead them to undervalue the opportunity cost of an
early withdrawal from an ESP. Similarly, many individuals dramatically underestimate
how much savings they will need to maintain their standard of living in retirement.
Cash outs need not be irrational, however. Although a costly source of liquidity,
distributions from ESPs may allow otherwise asset-poor workers to smooth consumption
following a job loss–behavior that is consistent with some variants of the permanent
income hypothesis (Deaton, 1991). Prior research on consumption behavior shows that
households suffering unanticipated income shocks do indeed engage in smoothing behavior
and, further, that low-asset household have difficulty obtaining credit during
unemployment spells (Dynarski and Gruber, 1997; Sullivan, 2008). Hence, ESPs may serve
as an important, albeit costly, safety net for these households.
This paper investigates the extent to which workers tap their ESPs in response to
unemployment-induced income shocks. By using data on job transitions, I am able to
identify workers for whom a job separation triggered a plausibly exogenous shock. The
results show that workers who did not have another job at separation, and therefore faced
an unemployment spell, were significantly more likely to take money from their ESPs than
workers who had secured another job. Similar to Engelhardt (2003), I also analyze the
relationship between the type of the separation–i.e., whether it was voluntary, involuntary
or due to some hardship–and disposition of ESPs. I find little evidence that the type of job
separation affects disposition outcomes and conclude that uncertainty over future
employment is more relevant to the disposition decision than whether workers left of their
own accord. Another key result from this analysis is the strong influence of workers’
financial situation on disposition outcomes. Specifically, low holdings of liquid assets, gaps
in health insurance, and poor access to credit markets are found to be strongly associated
with workers taking cash settlements from their ESPs at separation.
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Even if workers suffer an income shock, however, ESPs should not be tapped until
lower-cost sources of liquidity have been exhausted. Therefore, as an additional test of the
optimality of workers’ cash-out decisions, I estimate whether the effect of an income shock
is amplified in the presence of liquidity-constraints, defined here as either low liquid asset
holdings or a recent unsatisfied demand for credit. I find little evidence of such a positive
interaction effect. This finding, together with the strong main effects for the
liquidity-constraint measures, suggests that workers with low buffer-stock savings are
tapping their ESPs largely independent of the degree of income risk associated with the job
separation. One explanation for this behavior is that these workers are using the
opportunity to take a distribution from their ESPs to reallocate their portfolios to achieve
greater liquidity. Similarly, the effect of an adverse job separation does not appear to be
confined to liquidity-constrained workers. Both of these results are consistent with cash
settlements taken to augment precautionary savings. However, cash settlements taken
solely for precautionary reasons are not necessarily optimal.
Finally, I use information on both the timing of the job separation and job status at
separation to test whether workers are sensitive to the tax consequences of taking a cash
settlement. The test exploits the fact that workers who separate without another job early
in the year are more likely to anticipate lower than normal income for that year and hence
a relatively lower tax price on a cash settlement. The results yield some evidence that
these workers exhibit a greater propensity to cash out than workers who were left jobless
toward the end of the calendar year.
This study makes two primary contributions. First, it extends the limited prior research
on the disposition of ESPs at job change by explicitly considering the role of both income
risk and liquidity constraints–effects that have been difficult to pin down empirically. In
doing so, this study highlights the potential for leakages from ESPs in an economic climate
marked by both high unemployment and tight consumer credit markets.
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on households’ savings and borrowing
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behavior in response to idiosyncratic income shocks. While there is a substantial literature
examining how households adjust consumption, saving and borrowing behavior in
anticipation of predictable variation in income, far less is known about how households use
their financial assets to self-insure against unanticipated variation (Sullivan, 2008). This
study contributes to this latter strand of literature by highlighting a largely overlooked
potential smoothing mechanism for low-asset and borrowing constrained households.
2.2 Related Literature
While a fairly extensive literature has analyzed employee participation and contribution
decisions with regard to ESPs, considerably less attention has been given to pre-retirement
withdrawal decisions. Much of the prior research on withdrawals has analyzed the influence
of basic household and plan characteristics (Andrews, 1991; Bassett et al., 1998; Purcell,
2002; Poterba et al., 1998; Sabelhaus and Weiner, 1999). From this literature a number of
stylized facts about early withdrawals has emerged. One common finding was that while
the majority of plans were cashed out at separation, the majority of distribution dollars
were in fact rolled over–evidence that it was predominantly small balances that were being
cashed out. Moreover, these studies established that the probability of cashing out was
inversely related to income, age, education, and accumulated plan balance, as well as
proxies for “tastes for savings,” such as IRA and other asset ownership.
An underlying problem of many of these studies was that the data employed were
generally limited to workers who actually reported receipt of a distribution. Consequently,
workers who left the money to accumulate in their former employer’s plan were omitted,
leading these studies to underestimate the proportion of workers who preserved the
tax-deferred status of the assets in their ESP.
More recent work has attempted to incorporate a richer set of background variables in
the analysis of pre-retirement withdrawals. Some of these studies have focused on
9
estimating the responsiveness of the withdrawal decision to the tax price (Chang, 1996;
Burman et al., 1999; Gale and Dworsky, 2006). However, only two studies have explicitly
considered the the relationship between the disposition of ESPs and the circumstances
surrounding the job separation (Engelhardt, 2003; Amromin and Smith, 2003).
Using the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), Engelhardt (2003) finds that workers
who left their job to care for a family member and who quit their jobs were significantly
less likely to roll over their ESPs than workers who left because of a better employment
opportunity. Separations due to poor health, relocation, retirement or a layoff were, as
expected, also associated with lower rollover rates, but most of these effects were only
marginally significant.
One limitation of Engelhardt’s study is that half of the reported dispositions in his
sample occurred prior to 1984, more than eight years removed from the interview date.
This not only dates his results but also raises concerns about recall error. As with many
previous studies, Engelhardt’s sample is also restricted to workers who actually took a
distribution from their plan.
Amromin and Smith (2003)–the other study to examine the role of shocks–use a ten-year
panel of individual tax returns to estimate the probability of taking a penalized
distribution from an ESP or an IRA. They infer an involuntary job loss from the receipt of
unemployment compensation and find that this variable has a significant positive effect on
the the probability that workers take a penalized withdrawal from a retirement plan.
However, in probit models that include income and other demographic shocks, the
marginal effect of an involuntary separation is quite small, raising the probability of a
penalized withdrawal by approximately one percentage point. The use of administrative
tax records allows Amromin and Smith to construct accurate income measures, including
workers’ marginal tax rate. Yet these records lack many of the background variables found
in survey data. As a result, a number of variables, including the dependent variables, used
in their analysis must be imputed or inferred from the limited information on the tax
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returns. Similar to Engelhardt (2003), their sample does not include workers who left their
ESP with their former employer.
2.3 Data and Descriptive Results
This study takes advantage of the relatively new, and previously untapped, information on
pension withdrawals contained in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979
(NLSY79). The NLSY79 has tracked a nationally representative sample of 12,686 young
men and women from 1979, when the respondents were between 14 and 22 years old, to the
most recent interview in 2006. Interviews were conducted annually until 1994, and
biennally from 1996 to the present. Although the panel data cannot be fully exploited due
to the paucity of repeated observations on the dependent variable for any one individual, it
is still useful for deriving measures of key variables just prior to the separation date.
A pension module was introduced in the 1994 interview, but information on the
disposition of retirement plans from former employers was not included until the 2002
interview. The sample is taken from the 2002, 2004 and 2006 interviews, when respondents
were between the ages of 37 and 51. Although the age range is somewhat narrow, it does
capture the population of interest for this study, namely, individuals in their prime working
years.
The pension module begins by asking respondents who left a job since their last interview
about their access to any plans on that job: whether they were entitled to take money
from the plan when they left their employer, some time in the future, or both when they
left and in the future. In addition, respondents could indicate that they were not entitled
to the money at all, presumably because they had not yet become vested in the plan.
Respondents who were entitled to take any money from their plan at separation were
then asked what they did with the money. The outcomes included: 1) transferred the
money to another retirement plan or investment account; 2) took a cash settlement; 3) left
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the money in this plan; 4) currently receiving repeated payments; 5) haven’t received the
money yet (just left the job); and 6) some other use. Respondents who had not received
any money yet because they just left the job, as well as those who indicated some other
use, were taken through a series of follow-up questions in which they were again asked to
verify that whether any of the three primary disposition outcomes (rollover to another
plan, cash settlement, or left money with employer) applied. Because it does not trigger
the ten percent penalty, distributions converted into repeated payments (i.e., an annuity)
are coded as a rollover. A key advantage of the NLSY79 is that it identifies workers who
left money in their former employer’s plan, permitting more accurate estimation of the
proportion of workers who preserved the tax-deferred status of the assets in their ESPs.
One drawback, however, is that the NLSY79 does not provide very specific information
on the uses of cash settlements. Respondents could report only three uses for their cash
settlements: pay off debt, transfer to another tax-qualified account (i.e., an indirect
rollover), or spend or save for some other purpose.2 This last category unfortunately does
not distinguish between settlements that were consumed and those that were saved in
non-tax-qualified investment vehicles. The NLSY79 also does not probe further into the
specific ways in which distributions were spent, such as whether they were used to pay bills
and basic living expenses or to finance spending on less essential items.
Along with this detailed information on pension withdrawals, the NLSY79 contains a
rich set of background variables on income, demographics and assets. Of particular interest
for this study is the information on the circumstances surrounding the job separation that
gave rise to the disposition decision. The NLSY79 asks respondents both the reason for the
separation and whether they had another job lined up prior to separation. I collapsed the
17 reasons for separation provided in the NLSY79 into three types: voluntary, involuntary
2Cash settlements that were subsequently transferred to another tax-qualified account were coded as
rollovers. Although workers who choose an indirect rollover must pay income taxes on the amount withdrawn
(and are subject to employer withholding), they avoid the ten percent penalty if the transfer occurred within
60 days of receipt of the distribution.
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and hardship separations. Voluntary separations included workers who quit to take
another job, to look for another job, to retire, to attend school, or because of a pregnancy,
dissatisfaction with some aspect of the job or some other (unspecified) reason. Involuntary
separations are defined as those due to business closings, the end of a temporary job or
government program, layoffs, or discharges. Hardship separations included leaving because
of some family obligation, because of a move to another geographic area or because of their
own health, legal or transportation problems.3
Certain reasons for leaving triggered a follow-up question to determine whether the
worker had secured another job prior to separation. For those not covered by this question,
it was in most instances straightforward to infer from the reason for separation whether it
was likely that they had another job at separation or whether they would even be looking
for another job. To this latter category, for instance, I assigned respondents who left to
attend school or due to health reasons or family obligations (i.e., to spend time with or
care for a family member). Three reasons were somewhat ambiguous: separations due to a
relocation, transportation problems and some dissatisfaction with some aspect of the job.
Since respondents could specifically indicate leaving to take another job, these ambiguous
cases were resolved as not having another job at separation.
Another advantage of the NLSY79 is that it contains questions on respondents’ access to
credit in the past five years. The questions distinguish between three groups: 1) those who
needed credit but did not obtain any, either because their credit application was denied or
because they were discouraged from applying in the first place; 2) those who did not
require any credit, and 3) those who applied for and received credit. One drawback,
however, is that respondents were only queried about their credit status in the 2004
interview. As a result, there may be some measurement error if the respondent’s credit
status changed substantially over this period.4 However, Guiso et al. (1996) provide
3Because respondents could specifically report leaving to take another job, it was assumed that the
relocation were not job-related, at least not for the respondent.
4It is possible, for instance, that respondents who already experienced a separation may be more likely
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evidence that liquidity constraints tend to be fairly persistent, particularly over such a
short span of time. It should also be noted that merging the module on credit access with
the 2002 and 2006 interviews entails the loss of 20 observations from the sample.
2.3.1 Descriptive Results
Table 2.1 summarizes the basic demographic characteristics of workers in the sample
according to their access to plan funds and, for those entitled to take money at separation,
the disposition of those funds. In order to construct mutually exclusive disposition
outcomes, “cashed out” is defined as having taken any money from an ESP, while “rolled
over” captures workers who preserved the tax-deferred status of their entire plan balance,
including those who left the money in their former employer’s plan. Females, blacks,
divorce´es or widow(er)s, and the less educated all evince a greater tendency to cash out at
least some portion of their plan at separation. Households with no older children appear
more likely to preserve the tax-deferred status of their plan balance, while those with two
or more older children show a marked tendency to take a cash settlement–consistent with
the supposition that households with college-aged children, or children nearing college age,
will have a more acute need for liquidity.
Table 2.2 displays plan and job characteristics by entitlement and disposition. Workers
with less than two years on the job at separation are much more likely to report not having
access to the money in their plan. This result is in line with the vesting rules of most plans.
Although the non-entitlement rate drops off fairly precipitously after two years, as one
would expect, these rates still remain surprisingly high for long-tenured workers. This may
reflect some degree of misreporting, with respondents possibly mistaking “no entitlement”
for not being eligible to take a distribution at separation. However, this is only speculative.
to have applied for credit. I estimated a separate specification (not shown here) to test whether the effect of
credit status varies significantly by the interview year. While there is some evidence that credit constraints,
and not having applied for credit, has a stronger effect for respondents reporting job separations in the 2002
interview relative to the 2006 interview, the effects are not statistically significant.
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Table 2.1: Demographics by Entitlement and Disposition Outcome
Access to Money in Plan:
When Left Employer In Future None All
Cashed Out Rolled Over
Gender
Male 47.09 56.22 55.04 58.49 53.94
Female 52.91 43.78 44.96 41.51 46.06
Age
37-41 29.07 26.61 25.39 28.93 27.00
42-46 51.45 54.94 59.30 51.57 55.29
47-51 19.48 18.45 15.31 19.50 17.71
Race
Hispanic 20.06 19.10 20.74 22.01 20.20
Black 42.15 23.18 27.13 31.45 29.83
White/Asian 37.79 57.73 52.13 46.54 49.97
Marital Status
Never Married 15.70 11.59 15.31 13.21 14.01
Married 48.84 64.81 58.33 63.52 58.72
Divorced or Widowed 35.47 23.61 26.36 23.27 27.27
Education Level
Less than HS 7.85 2.79 3.10 6.92 4.51
High School 48.26 31.33 36.24 38.99 37.78
Some College 30.23 29.18 28.29 23.90 28.55
Bachelor’s Degree 8.14 20.60 14.73 19.50 15.56
Advanced Degree 5.52 16.09 17.64 10.69 13.60
No. of Kids under 15
None 51.74 46.78 47.67 42.77 47.81
One 24.13 26.39 21.51 25.79 24.11
Two or More 24.13 26.82 30.81 31.45 28.08
No. of Kids 15-23
None 43.02 56.01 54.46 52.83 52.12
One 24.42 25.97 22.67 23.27 24.18
Two or More 32.56 18.03 22.87 23.90 23.70
N 344 466 516 159 1,485
Source: NLSY79
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Table 2.2: Plan and Job Characteristics by Entitlement and Disposition Outcome
Access to Money in Plan:
When Left Employer In Future None All
Cashed Out Rolled Over
Plan Type
DC Plan Only 66.86 69.74 58.53 49.06 62.96
DB Plan Only 22.09 18.88 29.07 37.74 25.19
DC & DB Plan 10.17 10.30 8.72 6.92 9.36
Don’t Know 0.87 1.07 3.68 6.29 2.49
Tenure on Job
Less than 2 years 24.42 21.24 25.19 41.51 25.52
2 to 5 years 34.59 30.90 28.10 23.27 29.97
5 to 10 years 23.26 23.18 24.03 16.35 22.76
10+ years 17.73 24.68 22.67 18.87 21.75
Occupational Category
Management 9.88 18.61 13.98 13.92 14.47
Professional 15.41 26.62 21.17 20.89 21.50
Service & Sales 35.76 30.09 35.15 32.91 33.47
Blue Collar 38.95 24.68 29.71 32.28 30.56
Industry
Nat. Res. & Construction 4.65 5.36 9.11 8.18 6.80
Manufacturing 21.22 17.60 13.57 16.98 16.97
Trade 19.48 12.66 12.02 12.58 14.01
Transport. & Utilities 4.36 6.65 7.95 5.03 6.40
Information 6.98 4.94 5.23 4.40 5.45
Financial Activities 5.52 11.59 5.43 8.18 7.68
Prof. & Bus. Services 6.98 13.52 9.50 9.43 10.17
Education & Health 21.22 16.09 25.00 13.21 20.07
Other Services 5.52 6.22 6.59 10.69 6.67
Public Administration 4.07 5.36 5.62 11.32 5.79
N 344 466 516 159 1,485
Source: NLSY79
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Table 2.3: Disposition by New Job Status
New Job Status
Disposition Did Not Look for
New Job
No New Job
Lined Up
New Job Lined
Up
Total
Cashed Out Any 55.41 50.81 27.54 42.47
Rolled Over All 18.92 32.71 50.16 38.02
Left All in Plan 25.68 16.47 22.30 19.51
N 74 431 305 810
Source: NLSY79
Table 2.3 displays differences in disposition outcomes by job status at separation. As
expected, workers who do not have another job lined up, as well as those not looking for
another job (mainly due to some hardship), are nearly twice as likely to take at least some
money from their plan at separation. Just over half of those without another job took a
cash settlement, compared to just over a quarter of workers with another job. It is also
noteworthy that workers without a job and workers not looking for a job accounted for
over 60 percent of all workers entitled to take a distribution from their ESP at separation.
Workers who left without another job were much more likely to roll over their ESPs rather
than leave them with their former employer. This result would stand to reason if many of
these workers left on unfavorable terms.
Table 2.4 presents the proportion of workers who cashed out any money at separation by
both job status and liquid asset holdings. For each job status, the proportion of those who
cash out is declining at higher quartiles of liquid asset holdings. For workers with another
job, there is very little difference in the cash out rate between the first and second
quartiles; the cash out rate drops more precipitously for these workers over the next two
quartiles, with only eight percent of those in the fourth quartile opting to take money from
17
Table 2.4: Proportion of Workers who Cashed Out Any Funds
Liquid Asset Holdings (Quartiles)
Job Transition 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Total
Did Not Look for New Job 0.67 0.68 0.35 0.36 0.55
No New Job Lined Up 0.72 0.56 0.40 0.25 0.51
New Job Lined Up 0.47 0.43 0.23 0.08 0.28
N 215 211 183 200 809
Source: NLSY79
their ESPs. The decline in the cash out rate over quartiles of liquid asset holdings is more
uniform for workers without another job, yet the overall decline, from the first to the
fourth quartile, for these two groups of workers is not dramatically different.
In table 2.5, credit constrained workers exhibit the highest cash out rate, followed by
those who did not apply for credit and those who were approved for credit, for each job
status. Once again, although workers without another job are considerably more likely to
cash out than those with another job for each credit status, both groups of workers are
much more likely to cash out if their access to credit is restricted than if they have received
credit. The simple cross-tabulations suggest, then, that the effect of credit status, and
liquid asset holdings, cuts across job status, rather than disproportionately affecting those
left jobless at separation, as one might expect to observe if liquidity constraints amplified
the effect of an unemployment-induced income shock.
2.4 Results
To control for other factors influencing the probability that workers cash out any money
from their ESP when leaving a job, I estimate the following probit model.
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Table 2.5: Proportion of Workers who Cashed Out Any Funds
Credit Status
Job Transition Credit
Request
Approved
Did Not Apply
for Credit
Credit
Constrained
Total
Did Not Look for New Job 0.36 0.58 0.79 0.54
No New Job Lined Up 0.34 0.55 0.67 0.51
New Job Lined Up 0.18 0.28 0.48 0.27
N 293 340 157 790
Source: NLSY79
Prob(CashOut = 1) = Φ(γ′Zi + δJOBSEPi + βASSETSi + ρCREDITi) (2.1)
where Φ is the normal cumulative distribution function and Zi represents a vector of
controls for demographic characteristics of the worker and attributes of the ESPs held on
the job. These include controls for gender, race, age, marital status, education, the
logarithm of annual income on the job, the number of college-aged children and younger
children (under age 15), tenure on the job, industry and occupation dummies. It also
includes the natural logarithm of plan balances, dummy variables indicating whether the
respondent was entitled to withdraw money from two or more plans at separation and
whether she had any plans on the job that will provide future benefits.
JOBSEP is a vector of variables capturing the circumstances surrounding job
separation: either job status at separation or the type of separation. ASSETS is a vector
of variables reflecting the respondent’s holdings of financial assets, including indicators for
homeownership, IRA ownership, any gaps in health insurance coverage, and quartiles of
19
liquid asset holdings. CREDIT includes measures of credit access, with an indicator
variable identifying credit constrained workers–i.e., those who were denied credit or
discouraged from applying–and another identifying workers who did not apply for credit
during the past five years.
Table 2.6: Marginal Probit Estimates of Taking Any Cash Settlement
Without Credit Status With Credit Status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash Out Any Cash Out Any Cash Out Any Cash Out Any
Health Insurance Gap (d) 0.15∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046)
Owns IRA (d) −0.14∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗
(0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050)
Liquid Assets: Q1 (d) 0.27∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.064) (0.067) (0.066)
Liquid Assets: Q2(d) 0.20∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.060) (0.064) (0.063)
Liquid Assets: Q3 (d) 0.12∗ 0.12∗ 0.11∗ 0.11∗
(0.063) (0.062) (0.064) (0.063)
Credit Constrained (d) 0.23∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.059)
No Credit Sought (d) 0.15∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.047)
No New Job (d) 0.16∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.045)
Not Looking for Job (d) 0.16∗∗ 0.14∗
(0.077) (0.078)
Involuntary Separation (d) −0.017 −0.038
(0.045) (0.046)
Hardship Separation (d) 0.10 0.083
(0.069) (0.070)
N 800 800 780 780
Log Likelihood −401.7 −406.4 −382.8 −386.5
Pseudo-R2 0.264 0.256 0.280 0.273
Robust standard errors in parenthesis; (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. Models include controls for gender, race, marital status, education, children, year, income, industry, occupation,
tenure and plans on job.
Table 2.6 presents the marginal effects from probit models of taking any money from an
ESP at separation. The first column considers workers’ job status at separation. It reveals
20
that, for the average worker, not having secured another job at separation raises the
probability that at least some money is withdrawn from an ESP by 16 percentage points,
an effect that is significant at the 1 percent level. Not looking for another job at separation
also raises the likelihood of a cash out by the same magnitude, though this effect is not
measured as precisely. In interpreting this result, it is important to note that workers
characterized as not looking for another job are not necessarily leaving the job market of
their own choosing. Included in this category, for example, are workers who left due to
personal health problems or to care for a family member. Even those who are not looking
for a work because they left to obtain additional education or training may require
liquidity to finance their education or possibly to supplement lost earnings.
Column 2 examines the type of job separation. The effect of a hardship separation is
positive, as expected, and fairly large but not precisely measured. Workers who
experienced an involuntary separation are also not more likely to cash out than workers
who left voluntarily. In fact, the coefficient is slightly negative.
The results from table 2.6 suggest that whether workers have another job secured at
separation better captures the income shock associated with a job separation than whether
the separation is voluntary. Of course workers who leave of their own accord are far more
likely to do so because they have another job lined up, so it is difficult to completely
disentangle these two effects. Nevertheless, these findings highlight the importance of
prospective jobless spells to the cash out decision.
The effects of key asset measures remain consistent across these specifications. Workers
who owned an IRA prior to separation were markedly less likely to withdraw funds from
their plan. Also a costly source of liquidity, withdrawals from IRAs are in most cases
preferable to an ESP withdrawal since the former avoids the 20 percent withholding tax
and offers more exemptions to the ten percent penalty for early withdrawal. IRA
ownership may also signal greater financial sophistication and, in particular, a greater
ability to recognize the benefits of a rollover.
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The coefficients on the quartiles of liquid asset holdings show the expected pattern: low
liquid asset holdings significantly raise the probability that workers cash out and the effect
is strongest at lower quartiles. Liquid asset holdings in the first quartile, for instance, raise
the probability of a cash out by nearly 30 percentage points. The majority of respondents
in this category have effectively no liquid assets. Yet even for liquid asset holdings in the
second quartile, which range from a few hundred dollars to just over $2,000, the likelihood
of a cash out increases by 20 percentage points relative to the fourth quartile. Being
without health insurance at any time since the previous interview is also associated with a
significantly greater probability of a cash out at separation. These results are consistent
with workers using distributions from ESPs to compensate for low buffer-stock savings,
including gaps in health insurance coverage.
The last two columns in table 2.6 introduce variables that measure workers’ access to
credit in the past five years. Because adding these variables entails a loss of 20
observations compared to the base model, I present these models separately. The effect of
being credit constrained–i.e., being denied credit or discouraged from applying–raises the
probability of a cash out by about 23 percentage points. Not having requested any credit
also has a large positive effect, increasing the likelihood of a cash out by about 15
percentage points. Considering that workers’ liquid, and other, asset holdings are being
held constant, these effects are quite large. It is also notable the introduction of the credit
variables leaves the coefficient, and standard error, on the liquid asset measures virtually
unchanged, allaying a priori concerns of severe collinearity between these measures. The
effects of the variables characterizing the job separation are also consistent across
specifications with, and without, the credit variables.
Interaction Effects The findings that a prospective unemployment spell and that
meager asset holdings both have large positive effects on the cash-out probability suggest
that a significant number of cash outs are motivated by need rather than merely a desire to
22
finance frivolous spending. Although taking an early withdrawal in response to an income
shock, or to supplement meager liquid asset holdings, is more reasonable than taking a
withdrawal for a vacation, that is still not to say that workers are making the correct
decision by cashing out in those circumstances. Given the high cost of accessing these
funds, workers who take a cash out should exhibit both a need for liquidity and a lack of
suitably liquid assets with which to meet that need. In other words, in addition to the
positive main effects for measures of liquidity and adverse job separations, liquidity
constraints should amplify the effect of a job shock. To this end, I also estimate models
that control for the type job separation-induced shocks (i.e., job status at separation and
the type of job separation) interacted with the measures of liquidity constraints (both low
liquid asset holdings and credit access).
In non-linear models, the coefficient on the interaction term does not necessarily measure
the true interaction effect; i.e., the full cross-partial derivate or, in the case of two dummy
variables, the discrete double difference with respect to the two interacted variables (Ai
and Norton, 2003). I therefore also report OLS estimates, which permit a more
straightforward interpretation of the interaction effect. Due to small cell sizes, however, I
do not consider interactions for workers who were not looking for another job and those
who left due to hardship.
The first two columns of table 2.7 display results from the models in which job status at
separation is interacted with liquid asset holdings. Although the coefficient on the
interaction between the first quartile of liquid asset holdings and not having another job is
positive in both the probit and OLS models, neither estimate is precisely measured. The
probit and OLS models both produce similar positive estimates for the interaction of not
having requested credit and not having secured another job, but again neither coefficient is
significant.
In table 2.8, I also present probit estimates of the full interaction effect, following Ai and
Norton (2003), and compare these with traditional probit marginal estimates as well as
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OLS estimates. Letting x1 and x2 denote the two (dummy) variables to be interacted, the
formula for the full interaction effect is the following double difference with respect to x1
and x2:
5
∆2Φ(z)
∆x1∆x2
= Φ (β1 + β2 + β12 +Xβ)− Φ (β1 +Xβ)− Φ (β2 +Xβ) + Φ (Xβ) (2.2)
Since the calculation for models with more than one interaction term becomes unwieldy,
I restrict these models to only one interaction term. I have thus collapsed the quartiles of
liquid asset holdings into a single binary variable, denoted as “low liquid assets,” that
equals one if the worker’s holding of liquid assets falls below the median value for the given
survey year. The first three columns of table 2.8 present the results for the interaction of
this variable with not having another job at separation. The next three columns present
the models in which being credit constrained is interacted with not having another job. In
each case, the full interaction effects fall roughly between the marginal probit and OLS
estimates and do not alter the conclusions drawn from table 2.7.
Table 2.9 presents models in which the liquidity measures are interacted with the type of
job separation. In the first two columns, the probit and OLS produce broadly similar
results for the interaction of liquid asset holdings with the type of job separation. While
the effects have the expected positive sign, none are significant. Similarly, the interaction
between credit access and the type of job separation does not produce any significant
effects.
Table 2.10 again checks whether the full interaction effects from probit models are
5Standard errors for these interaction effects are derived using the delta method. With two dummy
variables the formula for the asymptotic variance of the interaction effect is:
∂
∂β′
[
∆2Φ(z)
∆x1∆x2
]
Ωˆβ
∂
∂β
[
∆2Φ(z)
∆x1∆x2
]
where Ωˆβ is a consistent estimator of the covariance of βˆ (Ai and Norton, 2003).
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consistent with the marginal probit and OLS coefficients. These estimates prove to be
remarkably similar to the OLS coefficients (and standard errors). Together, then, the
standard marginal probit and OLS estimates appear to provide a reasonably accurate
representation of the full interaction effect of the probit models.
Tables 2.7 and 2.9 yield little evidence to support the hypothesis that liquidity
constraints raise the probability that workers will tap their ESPs following an adverse job
separation. Before drawing definitive conclusions from these results, however, a couple of
points should be considered. First, given the sample size, the lack of significant interaction
effects may be attributable to small cell sizes for the interaction terms. A more conclusive
test must await the collection of additional data. Second, the measures of income shocks
employed in this study–in particular, whether a worker had another job at separation–may
be missing important heterogeneity in the severity of these shocks or in workers’
assessment of their future job prospects.
2.5 Tax Price Sensitivity
Although the NLSY79 does not lend itself to deriving accurate estimates of the tax price
facing workers, the information on job separations, and the timing of separations, can be
used to gain some insight into workers’ responsiveness to the tax price of taking a cash
settlement from their ESP.6 Given that they face a jobless spell of uncertain length,
workers who separate from their employer without another job lined up should anticipate a
lower than normal income for that calender year. Moreover, the earlier in the year that the
separation occurs, the greater the uncertainty about earnings for the remainder of that
year. As a result, workers who separate early in the year, and who do not have another job
lined up, are more likely to anticipate unusually low earnings for that year and thus a lower
6The difficulty involved in constructing direct measures of the tax price stems both from the one-year
gaps in information on income and from the incidence of missing information for various income sources
that would render an already small sample size unacceptably small. There is of course also the issue of the
endogeneity of the tax price.
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tax price. Hence, a relatively higher incidence of cash outs associated with separations
occurring early in the calender year by workers without another job may indicate that
these workers are indeed taking into account the overall tax price when deciding whether
to take a withdrawal. To investigate this effect I introduce controls for the time of the year
in which the separation occurred and interact this variable with whether the worker had
another job lined up. I estimate the follow probit model:
Prob(CashOut = 1) = Φ(γ′Zi + δJOBSEPi + βASSETSi + αNOJOBi ×
3∑
j=1
Qji) (2.3)
where NOJOB is an indicator variable equal to one if the worker does not have another
job lined up, and zero otherwise; and Qj is an indicator variable equal to one if the
separation occurred in the ith quarter of the year. Thus, the interaction term of interest,
NOJOB ×Qj equals one for workers who separated from a job in the ith quarter of the
calender year without another job lined up.
The results from table 2.11 provide some evidence that, for workers who have not
secured other employment at separation, the timing of separation matters. In particular, a
separation occurring in the first three months of the year raised the probability of a cash
out among workers without another job lined up by 30 percentage points, an effect that is
significant at the ten percent level. The interaction effect for workers without another job
is positive for each of first three quarters of the year and, as expected, the magnitude
decreases at later quarters. The same pattern is confirmed by the OLS estimates, although
none of these effects were significant.
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Table 2.11: Probability of Taking a Cash Out: Timing of Job Separation
Probit M.E. OLS
1st Quarter Separation (d) −0.18 −0.11
(0.099) (0.073)
2nd Quarter Separation (d) −0.043 −0.036
(0.10) (0.079)
3rd Quarter Separation (d) −0.075 −0.060
(0.095) (0.073)
1st Quarter × No Job (d) 0.30∗ 0.18
(0.12) (0.094)
2nd Quarter × No Job (d) 0.20 0.14
(0.13) (0.10)
3rd Quarter × No Job (d) 0.15 0.11
(0.13) (0.099)
1st Quarter × Not Looking (d) 0.26 0.18
(0.21) (0.17)
2nd Quarter × Not Looking (d) 0.19 0.19
(0.24) (0.20)
3rd Quarter × Not Looking (d) 0.047 0.080
(0.22) (0.19)
N 800 800
Log Likelihood −397.5 −422.5
Pseudo-R2 0.272
Robust standard errors in parentheses; (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Models include controls for gender, race, marital status, education, children, year,
income, industry, occupation, tenure and plans on job.
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper has attempted to shed light on why workers tap their ESPs at job change,
highlighting the effect of potential employment shocks and liquidity constraints. The
results showed that low holdings of liquid assets, gaps in health insurance coverage, and
credit constraints each have a significant positive effect on the probability of a cash out.
Moreover, not having another job lined up at separation increased the probability of a cash
out by about 15 percentage points. Given that most workers do not have another job when
separating from an employer, the strength of this relationship between job status and
disposition outcomes is alarming. On the other hand, whether a worker left a job
voluntarily or involuntarily did not appear to influence the cash out decision.
I also evaluated whether workers’ withdrawal decisions were consistent with consumption
smoothing in the presence of liquidity constraints. Neither credit constraints, nor meager
liquid asset holdings, were found to significantly raise the probability of a cash out for
workers most likely to have experienced an income shock at separation–i.e., those who left
without another job lined up or those who left because of some hardship. This raises some
concern that workers may be tapping their retirement savings when they would be better
served by rolling over the money. Nevertheless, the most compelling finding to emerge from
this study is that cash outs were strongly associated with indicators of need, whether it be
a poor financial position or short-term uncertainty about future income. It once again
confirms what other studies have previously observed: that those who can least afford a
loss of retirement savings are those most likely to cash out. In particular, the link between
the incidence of cash outs and these indicators of need raises the question of whether the
excise tax on early withdrawals is unnecessarily punitive and whether the opportunity cost
of giving up future tax-deferred earnings is not itself a sufficient penalty. The results also
point up the potential harm done to workers’ retirement savings in a prolonged recession.
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Chapter 3
A Tax Price Analysis of the
Disposition of Retirement Plan
Balances
3.1 Introduction
Public policy towards individual retirement savings contains both carrots and sticks. The
deductibility of contributions to these plans and the tax-deferred status of earnings serve
as the carrots that encourage individuals to put aside money for retirement; a ten percent
excise tax and a 20 percent withholding tax are the primary sticks that discourage
individuals from prematurely tapping their retirement funds. In addition, distributions are
taxed as ordinary income, which may also penalize early withdrawals to the extent that
individuals are likely to face a higher marginal tax rate during their working years than
they will in retirement.
Despite the tax-based disincentives, participants in plans offering lump-sum distributions
at job separation have cashed out at a surprisingly high rate. In fact, most studies have
found that a majority of participants take at least some money from their plan when
leaving an employer (Andrews, 1991; Bassett et al., 1998; Purcell, 2002; Poterba et al.,
1998; Sabelhaus and Weiner, 1999). This has raised the question of how responsive
participants really are to the tax incentives to preserve the tax-deferred status of their plan
balances when leaving a job.
While a considerable body of research has focused on the incentives to contribute to
retirement savings accounts, few studies have examined how tax policy affects individuals’
decisions to withdraw money from these accounts during their working years. In particular,
there have been few reliable estimates of the tax-price elasticity of rollovers from
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employer-sponsored retirement plans.
This study addresses this gap in the literature by deriving estimates of the sensitivity of
these disposition decisions to the effective tax price of a withdrawal. The approach taken
in study also differs from the scant prior research on this topic. First, this study uses
national survey data to generate effective tax prices using the NBER’s TAXSIM program.
The computation of effective rates take greater account of many of the nuances in the tax
code, such as the phasing in and out of credits and deductions, which can affect an
individual’s marginal tax rate and which is not reflected in statutory marginal tax rates.
Second, this study addresses the endogeneity of the tax price using both proxy measures
and instrumental variables. In sum, this study attempts to derive estimates of the tax
price elasticity of a taking a cash out using arguably better measures of the tax price than
have previously been employed in studies using survey data.
The findings are that while the tax price sensitivity of workers is still rather high, the
estimates obtained using the effective tax rates are somewhat lower than those obtained
relying solely on a straightforward calculation of the statutory marginal tax rate.
Another contribution of this study is that it provides the first estimates on the impact of
state-level penalties for early withdrawals. That is, a few states assess their own excise tax
on early withdrawals, on top of the federal one. However, no work has been done on
whether the existence of these state penalties have an additional deterrent effect on
participants’ decision to take money from their employer-sponsored retirement plans. The
results from this analysis indicate that, even when controlling for tax price, the existence of
a state-level penalty has a significant effect on the probability that workers’ preserve the
tax-deferred status of the entire employer-sponsored plan at job separation.
The results from this study have a number of potential policy implications. Tax policy
toward early withdrawals from retirement plans has not been without its critics, who see it
as unnecessarily punitive and paternalistic. If the trend toward employers reducing, or
suspending, their matching contributions continues, this criticism is likely to grow louder.
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Determining whether the tax price is actually effective in deterring early cash outs may
contribute to this policy debate. It is possible, for instance, that given better tax price
measures, and a sufficiently rich model, the tax price may not have a significant effect on
participants’ behavior. Other factors, such as participants’ current financial situation, may
be far more predictive of their disposition choice at job separation. Should this be the case,
an argument could be made that the tax penalty is not necessarily achieving its desired
effect and, in fact, is having the undesirable effect of targeting the financially distressed.
On the other hand, a finding of a high tax-price elasticity might afford policymakers
greater flexibility in using the excise tax to achieve specific policy aims. For instance, if the
need to generate revenue were to outweigh the desire to reduce the incidence of early
withdrawals, a high tax price sensitivity might signal an opportunity to raise more tax
revenue by lowering the penalty on early withdrawals.
3.2 Analyzing the Tax Price Effect
3.2.1 Empirical Challenges and Previous Approaches
Workers who take a distribution from their employer-sponsored retirement plan are
assessed federal and, if applicable, state income tax on the amount withdrawn. Income tax
is assessed on any distribution from a retirement plan, regardless of whether it is taken pre-
or post-retirement. However, since individuals tend to earn more, and hence face a higher
marginal tax rate, during their working years than they do in retirement, this income tax
burden is often more onerous for those taking premature (i.e., pre-retirement)
withdrawals.1 Moreover, if the distribution from an employer-sponsored retirement plan is
taken as a result of a job separation, workers under the age of 55 face an additional 10
percent federal excise tax (and possibly additional state-level penalties). The tax cost
1In a life-cycle framework, for instance, a rational agents should compare their current tax rate with their
the rate they expect to face in retirement.
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alone of taking a cash out can therefore amount to 30 to 40 percent (or more) of a
distribution for most workers.
Upon leaving a job, workers can avoid any taxation on their plan balance, either income
tax or the 10 percent penalty, by transferring their plan balance to another tax-deferred
savings account (e.g., an IRA or another employer’s plan) or by keeping the money in their
old plan (if their former employer permits this).2 If workers do take a withdrawal from their
plan, they can still avoid the 10 percent penalty–but not ordinary taxation–by transferring
their entire distribution to another tax-deferred plan, and this must include the 20 percent
of the distribution that employers are mandated to withhold for tax purposes.
While there are other aspects to the total cost of a cash out, such as the 20 percent
withholding tax and the opportunity cost of years of foregone tax-deferred earnings on plan
assets, the immediate tax consequences incurred by cashing out are likely to be the most
tangible for workers and therefore weigh heavily in their decision.3 The outcome of interest
in this study is whether workers kept their entire plan balance in a tax-deferred account
when leaving an employer. The distinction is made between those who saved their entire
plan balance and those who cashed out at least some portion because the former will have
avoided incurring any tax cost. To assess the effect of the tax price on the probability that
a worker preserves their entire plan balance, the following probit model is estimated:
Save All =
 0, if any money taken from plan(s)1, if no money taken from plan(s)
Pr(Save All = 1) = Φ(β′X + γMTR) (3.1)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, MTR denotes the
2Another, little-used, option that avoids the 10 percent penalty is to take distribution as periodic and
substantially equal payments (i.e., an annuity). Income tax will still be assessed on each payment.
3The withholding does not actually increase workers’ tax burden.
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marginal tax rate and X is a vector of covariates that include demographic variables
(gender, race, marital status, education, respondents’ health status, number of children,
and dummies for year and interview rotation), the natural logarithm of the value of the
respondents’ plan balance, the natural logarithm of family income, ownership of an IRA,
whether the respondent had previously taken a lump-sum distribution from an
employer-sponsored plan and whether they were required to take a withdrawal. All else
equal, the expectation is that the coefficient, γ, on the marginal tax rate is negative; in
other words, a higher marginal tax rate should encourage workers to preserve the
tax-deferred status of their retirement plan balances by either rolling them over to another
plan or leaving the funds to accumulate in their former employer’s plan.
Two previous studies have analyzed the effect of the tax price on lump-sum distributions
using the employee benefit supplements of the Current Population Survey (CPS).
Estimating a tax price probit model, Chang (1996) finds that a one percent increase in the
tax price raises the probability of a rollover between 2 and 4 percentage points, with
higher-income workers displaying greater responsiveness to the tax price.4 Although her
sample includes distributions taken between 1984 and 1988, family income is available only
for 1987. As a result, her tax price measure is based on income from this one year,
regardless of when the distribution was actually taken. She justifies this approach by
assuming that family income at the time of the distribution is highly correlated with
family income in 1987. Given that distributions are triggered by job separations, however,
this assumption may not be appropriate for the population under study. Further
compromising the precision of the income measure is the fact that the 1988 CPS reports
income in $10,000 brackets (including one $15,000 bracket), with a top-coding at $75,000.
Finally, the marginal tax rates in her study are determined using the schedule of statutory
income tax rates. This methods ignores items such as payroll taxes, state income taxes and
4She also employs a difference-in-difference approach in which she takes advantage of changes in the tax
treatment of distributions introduced by the 1986 Tax Reform Act.
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the phasing in and out of various credits and deductions that can cause an individual’s
statutory and effective marginal rate to differ substantially.
Burman et al. (1999) employ the 1988 and 1993 employee benefit surveys of the CPS to
analyze cash outs. They derive estimates of individuals’ marginal tax rates both at the
time the distribution is taken and at the time of retirement. To do this, they rely on the
strong assumption that individuals’ incomes remain at the same income percentile, relative
to their age cohort, throughout their life-cycle.
Amromin and Smith (2003) is the only study to make use of a large administrative data
set–a ten-year panel of individual tax returns from 1987 to 1996–to study withdrawals from
tax-deferred plans. While it lacks some of the background variables available in survey
data, their study has the virtue of being able to generate precise estimates of individuals’
marginal tax rates. They overcome the endogeneity of the tax price by including a lagged
measure of the marginal tax rate in their model, which yields a marginal effect on the
probability of a cash out of about -.5. 5
As alluded to above, two primary empirical issues confront tax price studies, which have
not necessarily been adequately addressed in the literature on early withdrawals from
retirement plans. One is the potential endogeneity of the tax price variable; the other
involves the identification of the tax price effect.
Endogeneity is a concern because the choices workers make regarding the disposition of
their retirement savings will partly determine their taxable income, and hence the tax
price. Feldstein and Taylor (1976), who examined charitable giving, was one of the earliest
tax price studies to address the endogeneity issue. The solution they proposed was to use
the “first-dollar” tax rate, or the rate that applies to the first dollar of a charitable
contribution. In another study of charitable giving, Feenberg (1987) employs an
instrumental variables approach to overcome the endogeneity of the tax price.
5Amromin and Smith do not report a tax price semi-elasticity, as Chang does. However, assuming an
average tax price between .2 and .3, this would generate a semi-elasticity between .1 and .15–slightly lower
than Chang’s estimates but more in line with my own.
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Endogeneity of the marginal tax price is also a concern to the extent that the rollover
decision may affect the individual’s taxable income indirectly. For example, receipt of a
lump-sum distribution triggered by a job separation may discourage workers from seeking
other employment in that year, leading the decision to withdraw money to be associated
with lower taxable income and hence lower marginal tax rates. A similar association may
arise if workers who leave their job involuntarily are more apt than those who leave their
jobs voluntarily to cash-out their plan balance because they face greater income risk.
Moreover, this effect may be greater for workers who experience a job separation early in
the year.
Variables that determine tax price, such as income and marital status, may well have a
direct, as well as indirect (i.e., through tax price), effect on the disposition of retirement
plan balances. Including these variables in the empirical model, along with the tax price
variable, can thus give rise to a nonlinear dependence among the explanatory variables.
Excluding these variables, on the other hand, will likely lead to a biased tax price effect.
Inflated standard errors are the typical symptom of this functional dependence among
the independent variables. However, as Feenberg (1987) notes, the focus on standard errors
is only diagnostic if the researcher can be certain that the estimated functional form is
correct–something that researchers rarely possess a priori. In the presence of functional
dependence, and without knowledge of the correct functional form, identification must
come from exploiting some independent variation among the independent variables.
3.2.2 Empirical Approach
This study largely follows the approach to estimating the tax price effect advocated in
Feldstein and Taylor (1976) and Feenberg (1987), who analyzed the tax price sensitivity of
charitable giving. The first model estimate the tax price effect by using a “first dollar” tax
rate as a proxy for the actual tax rate that workers face. The first-dollar rate the sum of
the effective federal marginal tax rate, the effective state marginal tax rate and the ten
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percent flat rate penalty (if the worker is under age 55), calculated net of any distribution
from their retirement plan. In other words, it is the marginal tax rate that applies to the
first dollar of a distribution. This leads to the following probit model:
Pr(Save All) = Φ(αFDMTR + β′X) (3.2)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, FDMTR denotes the
first dollar marginal tax rate, and the X is the vector of demographic and plan
characteristics defined above.
A second model uses a similar construct, the “last-dollar” tax rate, as a proxy for the
actual tax rate. The last-dollar effective tax price is calculated in the same manner as the
first-dollar rate, except that the worker’s entire plan balance is added to their taxable
income regardless of whether they actually took a distribution. Hence, the last-dollar rate
captures the price of cashing out one’s entire plan.
Pr(Save All) = Φ(αLDMTR + β′X) (3.3)
where LDMTR denotes the last dollar marginal tax rate.
Two features of the tax price variables used in these models should mitigate the
identification problem. First, the use of effective tax rates, which exhibit greater variation
within income classes than statutory rates, should lessen the potential for perfect
dependence of the tax rate on income. Second, the inclusion of the state tax rate in the tax
price draws upon a source of variation independent of personal characteristics.
In addition to estimating models using effective marginal tax rates, a third model follows
the more typical methodology of using the statutory marginal tax rate.
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Pr(Save All = 1) = Φ(αStatMTR + beta′X) (3.4)
where StatMTR denotes the statutory marginal tax rate. This rate is determined by
finding where the worker’s last dollar of federal taxable income (AGI minus deductions and
exemptions) falls in the federal marginal tax rate schedule and can differ from the effective
marginal tax rate, which reflects features of the tax laws not captured in the statutory
rate. While for most taxpayers the effective marginal will equal the statutory rate, these
two rates can also significantly diverge for a number of taxpayers (CBO, 2005). Again, this
is because the effective rate also reflects the phasing in and out of various tax provisions,
such as payroll taxes, deduction and credits.
The proxy variable approach goes some way toward mitigating the endogeneity of tax
price. However, the identification and endogeneity problems can be more satisfactorily
solved with an instrumental variables (IV) approach, provided suitable instruments for the
actual tax price can be found. In this context, a suitable instrumental variable would be
correlated with the tax price but not with other personal characteristics that affect the
disposition of retirement plans. One possibility is to use the first dollar rate as an
instrument, rather than just as a proxy, for the endogenous actual tax price. The first
dollar rate satisfies the condition of being highly correlated with the actual tax price. Yet
because it is so highly correlated with the endogenous variable, it may not be completely
independent of other, unobserved characteristics affecting the disposition decision.
Correlation between the instrument and the included variables again leads back to the
identification problem, while correlation of the instrument with unobserved characteristics,
captured in the error term, would lead to bias in the tax price coefficient.6 The following
two-stage IV model is estimated:
6Feenberg (1986) notes, for example, that because the first dollar rate is likely to exhibit less variation
than the endogenous tax rate, the IV estimates will be biased upward.
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MTR = αFDMTR + β′X +  (3.5)
Pr(Save All = 1) = Φ(γM̂TR + β′X) (3.6)
where MTR denotes the actual tax price that workers face, and FDMTR is the
first-dollar rate defined above.
A second set of instruments that I employ are dummy variables for the quarter of the
year in which the participant separated from their job:7
MTR = α′Quarter + β′X +  (3.7)
Pr(Save All = 1) = Φ(γM̂TR + β′X) (3.8)
where Quarter denotes a vector of dummy variables for the quarter of separation.
The rationale for using the quarter of separation as an instrument is that workers who
separate from a job earlier in the calender year are more apt to record lower earnings for
that year than workers who separate from their employer very late in the year. In other
words, workers who separate early in the year face greater uncertainty about their income
for that year and, if they face any jobless spell, are likely to forecast lower earnings, and
hence tax price, for that year. These instruments have greater validity, in terms of being
uncorrelated with error term in the outcome equation, than the first-dollar rate, but are
liable to be much weaker instruments.
Differences in state tax laws with respect to early withdrawals could deliver a more
7This SIPP does not permit the researcher to match information from the disposition of distributions
from their retirement plan to the specific job sponsoring that plan. It is possible, however, to produce a
match based on the year in which a distribution was reported and the year a job separation was reported.
As a consequence, there may be some measurement error for those few respondents who reported more than
one separation in a year.
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plausibly exogenous source of variation, but the correlation between these differences and
the total tax price is likely to be weak. State taxes, after all, make up a relatively small
percentage of the total tax price. And apart from differences in tax rates, state-level
differences in the tax treatment of early pension withdrawals may not account for a great
deal of variation in the tax price. A consequence of weak correlation between instrument
and the endogenous variable is large standard errors. However, since the magnitude of tax
price coefficients are typically quite large, the IV approach might still yield significant
effects (Feenberg, 1987).
3.3 Data
This study uses data from the 2001 panel of the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP), a national survey that tracks respondents over nine waves, or 36
months. An important advantage of the SIPP over other national surveys lies in its rather
detailed breakdown of income sources which facilitates constructing more accurate
measures of taxable income. In addition, the SIPP topical modules allow me to include
other key items used to calculate effective tax rates, such as the amount of property tax,
mortgage interest, spending on child care, out-of-pocket medical expenses and
contributions to retirement accounts.8 Another key advantage of using a national survey
like the SIPP is that it allows the research to control for a richer set of background
variables, which may themselves be driving the cash out decision.
However, analyzing the tax sensitivity of rollover decisions with survey data is also
hampered by a number of data constraints. The first is the relatively low incidence of
lump-sum distributions typically reported in a given cross-section. In fact, most of the
distributions reported in national surveys were received more than a year prior to the
interview and thus, without a sufficiently long panel, cannot be contemporaneously
8Property taxes were imputed owing to low response rates.
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matched with variables that tend to change over time. Second, survey respondents often
report their income with error (Pedace and Bates, 2000; Roemer, 2000). Third, most
national surveys lack a detailed breakdown of income sources that is useful for calculating
many of the credits and deductions available to tax filers. Finally most surveys ask
respondents about the lump-sum distributions they actually received and do not capture
workers who left the money to accumulate in their former employer’s plan. As a result, the
proportion of workers who cash out is often overstated.
Since it uses the SIPP, this study does not overcome concerns about the measurement
error endemic to survey data.9 To ensure that income, and other variables, are measured in
the same year as the distribution, I restrict my sample to distributions that were taken
during the course of the 2001 SIPP panel.10 The drawback of imposing this restriction is
that my sample size is rather small, covering two years (2001 and 2002) and consisting of
just over 700 observations eligible to take a distribution from their employer-sponsored
plan.
Although the SIPP lacks direct information on whether workers who previously left a job
were eligible to take a lump-sum distribution, it does permit me to account for a group of
workers with a high eligibility rate; namely, workers who expect future benefits from a
defined contribution (DC) plan sponsored by a previous employer. Hence, my sample is
not limited to workers who actually received a lump-sum distribution, and includes many
of those who were eligible to take a distribution but opted instead to leave the plan balance
with their former employer. There may be some measurement error, however, to the extent
that some individuals who expect future benefits from a DC plan may not have been
eligible to take a lump-sum distribution, while some DB plan participants–excluded from
the sample–may have been eligible to take a distribution.
Estimates of the marginal tax rates facing workers are generated with the NBER’s
9However, since the SIPP collects information on most income measures every four months, these concerns
are somewhat mitigated by a short recall period.
10My sample includes the first seven waves of the 2001 panel, where each wave spans four months.
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TAXSIM program. The TAXSIM program generates an individual’s effective marginal
rate, which reflects provisions of the tax code, such as the phasing in and out of various
credits and deductions, that may cause the statutory and effective rates to differ for some
tax filers (Congressional Budget Office, 2005). Another advantage of the TAXSIM program
is that it generates both state and federal income tax rates, while also accounting for the
interaction between the two by computing the credit allowed under federal tax law for the
amount of state taxes paid, and vice versa. The state tax rate is important for deriving an
accurate estimate of the tax price because funds from tax-deferred accounts that are not
rolled over into another qualified plan are in most cases also taxed at the state level.
Moreover, state tax rates provide an additional source of cross-sectional variation.
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics by whether participants saved their entire plan
balance or cashed out some portion. The third column displays the difference between the
first two columns and whether that difference is statistically significant using a t-test.
Recall that saving one’s plan balance refers here specifically to preserving the tax-deferred
status of one’s entire balance (i.e., either rolling it over into an IRA or into another
employer’s plan or, possibly, leaving the plan to accrue with their former employer).
A higher proportion of married participants rolled over their entire plan balance, while
divorced participants were more likely to cash out some portion of their plan balance at
separation. Only the youngest and oldest participants in the sample displayed significant
differences in their unconditional probability of rolling over their plan balance. Participants
under 35 years of age were more likely to take some money from their plan; the oldest
participants (between 55 and 64 years of age) were more likely to roll over their entire
balance. Each educational category recorded a significant difference in disposition choice.
Participants who did not hold at least a bachelor’s degree were more likely to take some
money from their plan, whereas those with a bachelor’s degree or higher were more likely
to roll over their entire plan balance. Among the racial categories, whites were more likely
to choose to save their distribution. Hispanics and blacks, on the other hand, were more
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics by Disposition Choice
Cash Out
Some Roll All Diff.
Female 0.506 0.523 −0.017
Married 0.637 0.739 −0.102∗∗
Single 0.135 0.129 0.006
Divorced 0.198 0.117 0.082∗∗
Widowed 0.030 0.015 0.015
Age: under 35 0.401 0.261 0.140∗∗∗
Age: 35-44 0.270 0.299 −0.029
Age: 45-54 0.249 0.263 −0.014
Age: 55-64 0.080 0.178 −0.098∗∗∗
Less than HS 0.059 0.023 0.036∗
High School 0.274 0.155 0.120∗∗∗
Some College 0.405 0.303 0.102∗∗
Bachelor’s Degree 0.215 0.324 −0.109∗∗
Advanced Degree 0.046 0.195 −0.149∗∗∗
Owns Home 0.688 0.801 −0.113∗∗∗
White 0.814 0.896 −0.082∗∗
Hispanic 0.080 0.032 0.048∗∗
Black 0.072 0.034 0.038∗
Asian or Other 0.034 0.038 −0.004
Family Income 53991.905 91165.080 −37173.175∗∗∗
Plan Balance 10251.163 40865.172 −30614.010∗∗∗
Poor Health 0.283 0.337 −0.054
Previous LSD 0.249 0.206 0.043
Required Withdrawal 0.266 0.222 0.043
Owns IRA 0.105 0.326 −0.221∗∗∗
Statutory MTR 0.255 0.294 −0.039∗∗∗
First Dollar MTR 0.179 0.253 −0.074∗∗∗
Observations 709
Estimates weighted using cross-sectional survey weights. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
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likely to take some money from their plan, although the unconditional difference for blacks
was only marginally significant.
Not surprisingly, average family income and average plan balances differed significantly
across disposition outcomes. The average family income among participants who rolled
over their entire balance was nearly $40,000 higher ($91,165 compared to $53,992); plan
balances among this group were more than $30,000 higher ($40,865 compared to $10,251).
No significant unconditional differences were recorded for poor health status, having
previously taken a lump-sum distribution or being required to withdraw money at
separation. A significantly higher proportion of IRA owners, however, saved their entire
distribution.
Participants who rolled over their entire distribution faced, on average, a higher
statutory marginal tax rate (determined using the family’s taxable income and the
statutory marginal tax rate schedule) relative to those who took some money from their
plan. The average first-dollar marginal tax rate (calculated using TAXSIM, net of any
distribution reported) was also significantly higher among participants who rolled over
their entire distribution and, in fact, the difference was larger than for the statutory rate.
3.4 Results from Probit Models
Table 3.2 presents marginal probit estimates from equation 3.2, which evaluates the
probability of preserving the tax-deferred status of one’s entire distribution. Here the tax
price is defined as the first dollar rate; that is, the sum of the effective federal marginal tax
rate, the effective state marginal tax rate and the ten percent flat rate penalty (if the
worker is under age 55), calculated net of any distribution from their retirement plan. The
model in column 1 omits both the natural logarithm of the individual’s plan balance and of
family income–variables likely to be collinear with the tax price. This specification yields a
derivative of the probability of saving one’s balance with respect to the tax price of .71–a
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Table 3.2: Marginal Probit Estimates of Rolling Over Entire Distribution
(1) (2) (3)
First Dollar MTR 0.71∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.39∗
(0.16) (0.17) (0.18)
Poor Health (d) 0.028 0.014 0.0093
(0.040) (0.041) (0.042)
Previous LSD (d) −0.16∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
Required Withdrawal (d) −0.067 −0.018 −0.019
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Owns IRA (d) 0.21∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.039) (0.039)
ln(Plan Balance) 0.11∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014)
ln(Family Income) 0.11∗∗
(0.039)
Semi-Elasticity 0.162 0.143 0.0887
N 709 709 709
Log Likelihood −381.5 −342.1 −338.0
Pseudo-R2 0.156 0.243 0.252
Robust standard errors in parentheses; (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Models include controls for gender, race, marital status, education, children, year,
income, industry, occupation, tenure and plans on job.
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large and significant effect. Adding the natural logarithm of the individual’s plan leads to
an attenuation of the magnitude of this estimate and a very slight change in the standard
error. Adding income to the model leads to an even larger reduction in the magnitude of
the tax price effect and an additional loss of precision.
The marginal probit effects can easily be converted into semi-elasticities by multiplying
the coefficient by the average tax price. Semi-elasticities permit a more natural
interpretation of the tax price effect; namely, the percentage point change in the probability
of a rollover induced by a one percent change in the tax price. These are reported at the
bottom of each column. For instance, the tax price semi-elasticity in column 3–the
preferred specification–indicates that a one percent increase in the effective marginal tax
rate raises the likelihood of preserving one’s entire plan balance by approximately .9
percentage points. This is about half the magnitude of the semi-elasticities estimated by
Chang (1996), whose lower-bound on this measure was about 2.
Table 3.3 presents marginal probit estimates for the effect of four different tax prices on
the probability of a worker rolling over their entire plan. The first column once again
displays results from the model that uses the first-dollar marginal tax rate (equation 3.2).
The second column present the marginal estimates from equation 3.3. The coefficient on
the last-dollar rate is nearly identical to that of the first-dollar rate. The higher
semi-elasticity, therefore, is a function of the higher average last-dollar tax rate.
Column 3 of table 3.3 displays the results from a model using the statutory marginal tax
rate (equation 3.4. It is notable that this definition of the tax price, which follows Chang
(1996), produces a tax-price elasticity that is higher than the effective tax rates in the first
two models but very much in line with Chang’s own estimates of tax-price elasticity, which
range between 2 and 4.
While the lower estimates derived using the effective rates (i.e., the first- and last-dollar
MTRs) may indicate that previous estimates using statutory rates overestimated the
responsiveness of individuals to the tax price of taking a withdrawal, there are some
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Table 3.3: Marginal Probit Estimates of Cashing Out Entire Distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First-Dollar Last-Dollar Statutory IV IV
MTR 0.42∗∗ 0.40∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗ 0.48 2.46∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.19) (0.39) (0.34) (0.54)
ln(Family Income) 0.088∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.058 0.087∗ −0.15∗
(0.041) (0.036) (0.041) (0.051) (0.078)
ln(Plan Balance) 0.095∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.019)
Poor Health (d) 0.010 0.0091 0.0077 0.031 −0.028
(0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.038)
Previous LSD (d) −0.19∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.056) (0.042)
Required Withdrawal (d) −0.023 −0.020 −0.016 −0.012 −0.0066
(0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.037)
Owns IRA (d) 0.14∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗
(0.044) (0.039) (0.039) (0.054) (0.042)
Instrument(s): First Dollar MTR
√
Instrument(s): Quarter of Separation
√
Semi-Elasticity 0.0952 0.142 0.381 0.132 0.669
N 709 709 709 709 709
Log Likelihood −335.2 −338.2 −334.7 687.1 239.5
Pseudo-R2 0.258 0.251 0.259
Robust standard errors in parentheses; (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
Models include controls for gender, race, marital status, education, children, year, income and interview rotation.
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reasons why the latter estimates might be preferred. It could be that the effective marginal
tax rates are subject to greater measurement error and hence greater attenuation bias
(provided that error is random). The difference may also be partly attributable to a key
difference in the samples; namely, the inclusion in this study who were likely eligible to
take a distribution at job separation but opted to leave the money in their former
employer’s plan to accumulate.
On the other hand, deriving marginal tax rates from marginal tax brackets mitigates the
measurement error inherent in the income measures and, hence, reduces this attenuation
bias. Another possibility is that statutory rates are more likely enter into individuals’
decision rules because they are less complicated to calculate than the effective rate and
tend to be more familiar to tax filers. As noted in CBO (2005), “ [...] the income tax
system does not make effective marginal rates very apparent, even when people use
tax-preparation software.”
Column 4 displays the marginal probit estimates from equations 3.5 and 3.6, using the
first dollar rate as an instrument for the actual tax price. The IV estimate is slightly larger
in magnitude than the probit estimate of the first dollar rate. And, as expected, the IV
estimate is considerably less precise. The IV estimates from equations 3.7 and 3.8 using
the quarter of separation as instrument, shown in column 5, yields a very large tax price
effect, much larger even than the effect measuring the statutory marginal tax rate. And
although the standard errors are large, the coefficient on the tax price is still highly
significant. In the first stage regression (not shown here) only the first quarter of
separation is significant at the ten percent level and, as expected, the effect is negative; the
instruments are not jointly significant, however. The weak correlation between the
instruments and the endogenous accounts for the upward bias in the tax price coefficient in
the second-stage probit, and this bias appears to be quite large.
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3.4.1 State Penalties for Early Withdrawals
As previously discussed, state-level differences in the tax treatment of withdrawals could
serve as instruments. However, IV probit models estimated using an indicator variable for
states that impose an additional penalty for early withdrawals from employer-sponsored
plans did not converge. Part of the difficulty in employing the probit IV approach, as
opposed to a linear IV regression with a first-stage probit, is that identification cannot
come from functional form difference in the first- and second-stage models.11
Pr(Save All) = Φ(αState Pen+ γFDMTR + β′X) (3.9)
where State Pen denotes a dummy variable equal to one if the state in which the worker
resides has a penalty for early withdrawals from employer-sponsored plans.
Although state-penalties proved to be poor instruments for the tax price, it may still be
of interest to assess the independent effect of state-level penalties on the disposition
decision. The heterogeneity in type of penalties that states impose is ignored. Instead, the
existence of any state-level penalties is captured by an indicator variable that is equal to
one if the state imposes any additional penalty, beyond assessing ordinary state income tax
on a distribution.12 I include the first-dollar tax rate in these models, since the TAXSIM
program does not explicitly account for early withdrawal penalties. I also eliminate
workers aged 55 and over, as they will not be affected by these penalties.
Table 3.4 presents the marginal probit estimates of the effect of state-level early
withdrawal penalties. The results are consistent across specifications. An additional state
11In addition, for models with multiple instruments, the IV probit model does not allow one to test for
validity of overidentifying instruments
12Some states such as California and Maine assess a penalty that is equal to a percentage of the distribution,
while others such as Wisconsin and Vermont assess a percentage of the federal tax on early withdrawals.
My own examination of state income tax documents yielded six states that imposed an additional penalty
on early withdrawals from employer-sponsored retirement plans.
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Table 3.4: Marginal Probit Effects of State Penalties for Early Withdrawals on Rollover
Decision
(1) (2) (3)
Save All Save Any Save None
State Penalty (d) 0.13∗ 0.13∗ −0.11∗
(0.055) (0.052) (0.056)
First Dollar MTR 0.43∗ 0.32 −0.31
(0.20) (0.18) (0.18)
ln(Family Income) 0.12∗ 0.099∗ −0.098∗
(0.048) (0.046) (0.046)
ln(Plan Balance) 0.11∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Poor Health (d) −0.00094 −0.021 0.022
(0.046) (0.045) (0.046)
Previous LSD (d) −0.21∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.054) (0.055)
Required Withdrawal (d) −0.0090 0.0068 −0.028
(0.049) (0.047) (0.048)
Owns IRA (d) 0.19∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.042) (0.044)
N 606 606 606
Log Likelihood −294.3 −289.1 −297.7
Pseudo-R2 0.257 0.256 0.247
Robust standard errors in parentheses; (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001. Models include controls for gender, race, marital status, education, children, year, income and rotation.
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penalty raises the probability of preserving the tax-deferred status of one’s plan balance by
13 percentage points. And it reduces the probability of cashing out one’s entire plan by 11
percentage points. Each effect is significant at the 5 percent level. Considering that these
models are controlling for state and federal tax rates, which includes the federal penalty,
the magnitude of this effect is notable. In particular, it suggests that states may have
considerable scope in further discouraging early withdrawals (and in potentially generating
state revenues), if such a policy goal is deemed desirable.
3.5 Conclusion
This study has provided estimates of the responsiveness of rollover decisions to the tax
price, adding to the rather limited knowledge about the effectiveness of this aspect of state
and federal tax policy. The results broadly confirm the relative responsiveness of
participants’ rollover decision to the tax price. Using the preferred estimates of the tax
semi-elasticity of between 1 and 1.5, a one percent increase in the tax price translates into
a 1.5 to 2.3 percent decrease in cash outs. This points to the useful of this policy
instrument to achieving specific goals, such as raising the penalty to further reduce early
cash outs or, potentially, lowering it to raise tax revenue.
In particular, this study has attempted to address concerns about the endogeneity of the
tax price in several ways. First, the use of the first dollar tax price, or the marginal tax
rate net of any distribution, removes the most obvious source of endogeneity: the partial
determination of the tax price by the disposition decision. In addition, IV probit methods
were employed to overcome the endogeneity problem.
The first IV approach, suggested by Feenberg (1987), is to use the first dollar tax rate as
an instrument for the endogenous tax rate. This model produced estimates very similar to
those generated using the first dollar tax price as a proxy for the actual tax rate. IV
estimates using quarter of separation produced much larger estimates, but the weakness of
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these instruments cast some doubt on the reliability of these estimates. The estimate of
the tax price effect derived using statutory rates were in line with those found in Chang
(1996) who used the same method with data from the CPS. Interestingly, however, the
estimates derived in this study using effective tax rates produced markedly lower
elasticities, although still rather large. On the one hand, the effective rates used in this
study, which are calculated using detailed information on income sources from the SIPP,
incorporate more provisions of the state and federal tax codes and address the endogeneity
of the tax price–are likely more accurate and thus preferable to previous estimates. The
lower estimates obtained using effective marginal tax rates and a fairly rich set of control
variables suggest that other factors may play a larger role in the rollover decision than
commonly thought.
On the other hand, there is some question as to how well taxpayers perceive their
effective marginal tax rate. If it is not well perceived by taxpayers, the effective rate may
inform taxpayer’s’ decisions to a far lesser extent than the statutory rate and therefore the
statutory marginal tax rates may be the behaviorally more relevant measure of the tax
price. Moreover, because measurement error inherent in constructing taxable income from
survey data is less likely to impair the estimates of the statutory tax rate, the tax price
elasticity derived using statutory rates is subject to less measurement error. The addition
of more data from future SIPP panels will be useful for obtaining more reliable estimates.
Finally, this study presented the first estimates, to my knowledge, of the impact of
state-level early withdrawal penalties on the disposition decision. The results suggest that
these state-level penalties are effective, even when accounting for the other differences in
state tax regimes captured in the total tax price. If leakages from employer-sponsored
plans continue to jeopardize individuals’ retirement income security, states could take an
expanded role in curbing the incidence of early withdrawals from employer-sponsored plans.
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Chapter 4
Financial Attitudes and the Use of
Cash Settlements from Retirement
Plans
4.1 Introduction
This paper examines how participants’ diverse set of financial attitudes and preferences
affects what they do with their retirement plan balances when leaving a job. To this end, I
take advantage of the broad range of questions in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)
that capture households’ financial attitudes and behaviors to derive a summary measure of
households’ overall financial ‘personality type.’ These include questions on households’
financial planning horizon, financial risk tolerance, savings goals and habits, attitudes
toward buying on credit and spending out of capital gains. Another contribution of this
study is to shed light on the relationship between the cash out decision and households’
subjective expectations about longevity, retirement and income.
In addition to investigating whether certain financial personality types are at greater risk
of taking money from their employer-sponsored retirement plan at job separation, this
study looks at more specific uses of cash settlements. In evaluating the relative merits of
taking a withdrawal from retirement savings, there is often an important distinction to be
made between participants who use their settlement to gain some relief from indebtedness
and those who simply use their settlement for current consumption. The charge that early
withdrawals are largely the result of participants giving in to the temptation of spending a
large lump-sum payout is vitiated to the extent that settlements are used to pay off bills, or
even to invest in other non-tax-deferred instruments, rather than to finance consumption.
The growth of defined contribution (DC) plans has substantially increased the burden on
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workers to manage their retirement savings. Workers covered under these plans typically
face several decisions that can profoundly affect their retirement security, starting with the
decision of whether to participate in their employer’s plan to the subsequent decisions, if
they do opt in, of how much to contribute, how to invest those contributions and, upon
separation from the job, how to dispose of their plan assets.
DC plans have generally required that participants take a far more active role in
planning for their retirement than under traditional defined benefit (DB) plans, which take
most of these decisions out of workers’ hands. Indeed, the benchmark against which
participant behavior in DC plans is typically evaluated is that of a “good financial
planner” (MacFarland et al., 2004; EBRI, 2002). The set of behaviors expected of a such a
“planner” has been summarized as follows: (MacFarland et al., 2004):
[R]ational participants would be expected to calculate an adequate savings rate
and construct an optimal investment portfolio. When they change jobs,
participants would be expected to avoid tax penalties and not spend their
assets. At retirement, [...] workers would be expected to generate a suitable
income stream from their savings for life, managing mortality risk and avoiding
premature depletion of assets.
In reality, however, DC plan participants differ widely in terms of their knowledge and
interest in financial matters, as well as their savings preferences, with many falling short of
the “planner” paradigm. In fact, the evidence indicates that most individuals lack
confidence in their ability to plan for retirement and, perhaps because of this, also spend
very little time putting together any sort of long-term financial plan (Bernheim, 1994;
Lusardi, 2000, 2003; Ameriks et al., 2003). A retirement readiness survey by the Employee
Benefits Research Institute (EBRI) found, for instance, that only about one-third of
respondents had undertaken even the very basic task of setting a savings goal (EBRI,
2002). Similarly, results from a Vanguard Group survey suggested that only about half of
the respondents held beliefs and attitudes consistent with a “successful planner”
(MacFarland et al., 2004). As DC plan coverage extends to more and more workers who
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lack the inclination or aptitude for the financial decisions associated with these plans, the
question arises as to whether this deficit is translating into poor plan management and,
ultimately, into decreased retirement security for plan participants. The concern is that
financially diffident, or indifferent, participants might be more prone to making poor
decisions that jeopardize their retirement income security.
To help “non-planners” navigate through these financial decisions and to “nudge” them
toward more optimal behavior, many plans have default options which have increased
participation and contribution rates (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; Madrian and Shea, 2001;
Benartzi and Thaler, 2004). Until recently, however, one aspect of DC plan management
arguably not covered by an “optimal” default–at least from the perspective of the
worker–was participants’ disposition options at job separation. In particular, the default in
most plans was for employers to automatically cash out smaller balances (those under
$5,000), which may have significantly contributed to the high cash out rates among plans
with small balances.1
As noted above, the expectation is that, when changing jobs, “rational” participants
should generally avoid incurring the substantial tax penalties associated with early
withdrawals from their retirement plans. These include a 10 percent excise tax for workers
under age 55 if the withdrawal is taken in conjunction with a job separation (under 59
1
2
otherwise), a 20 percent withholding tax as well as the ordinary income tax assessed on a
distribution. Moreover, participants are giving up the substantial benefit of tax-deferred
compounding when they withdraw assets from their retirement plans.
Despite these costs, households have taken withdrawals at a surprisingly high rate when
changing jobs. How basic participant and plan characteristics affect the likelihood of a cash
out have been fairly well established. In particular, age, income and the size of the
settlement tend to be inversely related to the probability that participants choose to cash
1This default was changed in 2005 so that employers are required to roll over balances under $5,000 into
an IRA if not instructed to do otherwise by the employee.
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out (Munnell and Sunde´n, 2004; Moore and Muller, 2002; Purcell, 2000). Considerably less
is known, however, about how households’ heterogeneous savings preferences and attitudes
influence participants’ decisions.
This study confirms the independent effect of financial attitudes and behaviors on the
cash out decision. It identifies a segment of plan participants–comprising about
one-quarter of the sample–whose financial attitudes and behaviors do not comport well
with those of a “successful planner” and who are at significantly higher risk of depleting
their retirement savings at job separation. These participants display significant differences
along a number of dimensions, most notably planning horizon, savings goals and habits
and credit card behaviors. Additionally, there is evidence that cash outs by this at-risk
segment are driven to a large extent by a need for current consumption. Unlike cash
settlements that are used to pay off debt or to invest in other, non-tax-deferred
instruments, this use of cash outs means that indeed, for many of these participants, there
is a total leakage from their retirement savings.
4.2 Empirical Approach
4.2.1 Financial Personality Types
This study first performs a cluster analysis to create distinct attitudinal and behavioral
segments, or “financial personality” types. The clusters are generated using an iterative,
non-hierarchical, k -means clustering procedure with a Jaccard binary similarity coefficient.
This statistical technique assigns participants to a pre-determined number of segments, or
clusters, based on their degree of similarity according to the items selected for the analysis.
Essentially, it attempts to tease out of the data “natural groupings” of participants along
the specified dimensions (MacFarland et al., 2004). The clusters are generated in such a
way that the difference of participants within each cluster are minimized and the
differences of participants between clusters are maximized.
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The results from the cluster analysis are then used to analyze relationship between
financial types and the probability that households withdraw some money from their plan
is then investigated with both probit and multinomial logit models. The specific items
used as inputs in the cluster analysis reflect various facets of households’ financial attitudes
and preferences and behaviors. These items are briefly described below.
Financial Fortunes, Planning Horizon, and Risk Tolerance The first item reflects
households’ financial planning horizon, which can also serve as a proxy for their rate of
time preference (Lusardi, 1998). Households reporting a planning horizon of a year or less
are characterized as short-term planners; those with a horizon of more than a year and up
to ten years are labeled medium-term planners; and those with a horizon of more than 10
years are denoted long-term planners. The SCF also asks households about the amount of
financial risk they are willing to take in exchange for a corresponding potential reward; for
instance, whether they are willing to take substantial risk for substantial reward or no risk
for no reward. Lastly, as a measure of their perceived financial fortunes, respondents are
also asked to what extent that would agree, or disagree, with the statement that they have
been “lucky” in their financial affairs.
Savings Goals and Habits The more than twenty responses to the question on
households’ savings goals have been collapsed into four categories: whether households are
saving primarily for retirement, for precautionary reasons, for human capital and other
investments or to make large purchases. I classify respondents as retirement savers if their
primary reason for saving was either explicitly for retirement or, more generally, ”for the
future.” Precautionary savers were those primarily motivated to save for the following
reasons: to have reserves in case of unemployment, illness, emergency or for “rainy days,”
other unexpected needs, security and independence, liquidity or to have cash on hand.
“Family” savers are those putting aside money for their own education or that of a family
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member, for some other family-related reason, for a business or for some other investment.
The last category of savings goals includes those who are essentially saving to make a large
purchase or for some other, non-investment expenditure (or not saving at all). This
category is comprised primarily of respondents saving for a home, home improvements, a
vehicle, vacation and other miscellaneous expenditures.
Since the responses to these questions are collected after households decided on the use
of their cash settlements, a causal interpretation of these variables in this model hinges on
the assumption that respondents’ attitudes and habits have remained relatively fixed, at
least over the last few years and, more crucially, were not themselves changed by their
disposition decision. It is also important to bear in mind that the types of savings goals
that households deem important are in many cases borne out of their recent financial
experience. For instance, respondents may have begun saving for precautionary reasons
because they recently suffered an income shock. To the extent that I am unable to
adequately control for past shocks, a self-reported precautionary savings goal may reflect
recent volatility in the household’s income history. If this is the case, precautionary savers
might be more apt to use their cash settlement to pay off debt or expenses incurred as a
result of this income volatility.
Saving Habits Respondents’ saving habits are captured in the SCF by a question that
asks whether respondents regularly put aside money each month, saved somewhat
irregularly or whether they were generally unable to put aside any money at all.
Households with strong savings habits should be less inclined to use their settlement for
consumption, whereas those that have had difficulty saving may have a substantial need to
take a cash out. Another measure of savings habits is whether households have saved, or
have begun saving, for a large, anticipated expense. This may be liquidity needed for a
down payment on a house or to finance an education. Although framed as “expected” at
the time of the survey, these expenses may have initially arisen from a shock. That is, at
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the time the cash settlement was taken, some of these expenses may have been
unanticipated. This may be true, for instance, with expenses related to the care of the
respondent or a respondent’s family member. Education related expenses, on the other
hand, are less likely to have arisen from past shocks.
Credit Card Behaviors A key dimension of financial management is how households
use their credit cards. The SCF queries households on whether they own a credit card and,
if they do, how often they typically pay off their entire balance each month: always, almost
always, sometimes or hardly ever.
Other Attitudes towards Consumption The SCF contains several other questions
that elicit respondents’ attitudes toward consumption. One asks how likely respondents are
to spend more if the assets they own increase in value. Another question asks whether
respondents find it acceptable to borrow for various uses. The measure extracted from this
question is whether respondents believe that it is okay to borrow for a vacation or other
luxury items like a fur coat or jewelry. Finally, the SCF queries respondents about their
attitude toward making purchases on installment plans. The variable related to this
question equals unity for workers who believe that buying on installment is an
unequivocally bad idea. Each of these variables attempts to capture households’ propensity
to spend.
Interest in Financial Matters Also included in the cluster analysis are items that
attempt to capture households’ interest in, or attention to, financial decisions. The first of
these items measure how much shopping households do when making both credit and
investment decisions. Each variable equals one if households indicated that they shop “a
lot.” In general, households that research their financial decisions by “shopping around”
should be less prone to making a poor decision about the disposition of their retirement
plan when leaving a job. One issue with these questions is that they do not identify those
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who may shop very little for, say, investments because they do not invest much. By the
same token, households that shop a lot for credit may do so because they have taken on a
lot of debt and hence may have a greater need for liquidity.
In addition, the SCF asks respondents about the sources of financial information that
they use for both credit and investment decisions. The categories created from these
questions include “calling around,” media, financial professionals, and friends and relatives.
The sources of information on which households rely for financial decisions may also
provide some indication of their level of financial literacy and interest. In general, friends
and relatives are seen as less reliable sources of financial information than financial
professionals or even media sources. Furthermore, relying on financial information from
media sources and from “calling around” may signal that the household is a more avid
consumer of financial information.
Two other studies have used cluster analysis to segment retirement plan participants
into financial personality types. MacFarland et. al (2004) examine the link between
attitudes toward money and retirement planning using a 26-item survey sponsored by The
Vanguard group. The authors carry out cluster analysis to classify respondents as one of
five different “money attitude” segments. Individuals with the most desirable set of
attitudes and behaviors are labeled “successful planners.” As the name implies, these
individuals have a long-term financial planning horizon, believe they are well prepared for
retirement, have strong savings habits, are willing to take financial risks for financial gain
and rely on a number of different sources when making decisions. A second group, labeled
“Up and Coming Planners,” closely resemble “successful planners” in most every respect
except that they lack the successful planners’ confidence in their financial plans. Like the
previous two groups, “Secure Doers” exhibit a strong interest in saving but more out of a
sense of obligation and, further, lack the zeal for planning that characterize the two groups
of “planners.” The “Secure Doers” also distinguish themselves from the previous two
“planner” segments by their greater aversion to financial risk. Finally, among those with
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the least desirable set of “money attitudes,” MacFarland et al. (2004) identify two groups
of “avoiders.” “Stressed Avoiders” are individuals who have not put much effort into
financial planning, primarily because it causes them stress and anxiety. “Live-for-Today
Avoiders” have similarly given little thought to their future future but not out of stress or
anxiety.
Not surprisingly, the authors find important differences in the demographic and
socio-economic makeup of these groups: Successful Planners were older, more educated,
better paid and had saved more than other segments. On the other hand, Live-for-Today
Avoiders were younger, less educated, lower paid than other segments. Another finding of
interest to the present study is that the authors’ cross-tabulations reveal that both types of
“avoiders” exhibited a greater willingness to tap their retirement plan for needs other than
retirement. However, the authors do not employ multivariate methods to test for
significant differences in the behavior of these financial personality types.
An EBRI (2002) study undertakes a similar cluster analysis on the beliefs and attitudes
of individuals using data from their annual Retirement Confidence Survey. This study
arrives at a similar typology: Planners, who are enthusiastic about retirement and financial
planning; Savers, who have good savings habits but are financially risk-averse; Strugglers,
who have good intentions but are held back by financial problems; Impulsives, who lack
good savings habits; and Deniers, who avoid planning because they feel achieving
retirement security is a futile endeavor.
It should be noted that the data used in this study does not contain the same detailed
information on attitudes and behaviors related specifically to retirement planning as the
data sources in EBRI (2002) or MacFarland et al. (2004). The segments in this study
therefore reflect more general financial attitudes and behaviors. Moreover, the number of
items used in the cluster analysis is also not quite as extensive; as a result, fewer clusters
are employed.
Table 4.1 presents a summary of financial attitudes and behaviors by financial
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Table 4.1: Financial Attitudes and Habits by Personality Type
Financial Personality Type
1 2 3 4 Total
Planning Horizon
Short Term 18.04 14.36 22.52 62.50 24.16
Medium Term 52.78 68.32 58.56 32.81 54.16
Long Term 29.18 17.33 18.92 4.69 21.69
Financial Risk Tolerance
Above Average 46.55 47.03 29.73 19.53 40.67
Average 42.98 46.53 49.55 31.25 42.92
None 10.47 6.44 20.72 49.22 16.40
Primary Reason for Saving
Retirement 63.92 53.96 46.85 22.66 53.60
Precautionary Reasons 16.26 18.32 20.72 35.16 20.00
Human Capital or Other Investments 13.59 18.32 17.12 17.19 15.62
Housing or Large Purchases 6.24 9.41 15.32 25.00 10.79
Adequacy of Retirement Income
1: Totally Inadequate 28.73 34.65 39.64 46.09 33.93
2 20.94 16.34 26.13 20.31 20.45
3 25.61 29.21 24.32 25.00 26.18
4: Very Satisfactory 24.72 19.80 9.91 8.59 19.44
Savings Habits
Saves Regularly 96.88 33.17 14.41 3.91 58.76
Saves Irregularly 3.12 59.90 47.75 26.56 24.94
Does Not Save 0.00 6.93 37.84 69.53 16.29
Saving for Major Expense
Saving or Already Saved 48.78 50.99 18.92 14.06 40.56
Not Saving Yet 16.70 16.34 54.05 49.22 25.96
No Major Expense 34.52 32.67 27.03 36.72 33.48
Buying on Installment
Good Idea 32.52 29.21 31.53 27.34 30.90
Good & Bad 36.30 33.17 35.14 32.81 34.94
Bad Idea 31.18 37.62 33.33 39.84 34.16
Borrow for luxury items?
No 79.73 83.66 78.38 77.34 80.11
Yes 20.27 16.34 21.62 22.66 19.89
Spend More when Asset Values Increase?
Agree 26.50 32.67 29.73 33.59 29.33
Undecided 12.92 11.39 11.71 20.31 13.48
Disagree 60.58 55.94 58.56 46.09 57.19
Pay Off Credit Card Balance?
Always or Almost Always 60.13 67.82 31.53 8.59 50.90
Sometimes 17.15 15.84 19.82 17.97 17.30
Hardly Ever 14.03 8.91 43.24 29.69 18.76
No Credit Cards 8.69 7.43 5.41 43.75 13.03
N 449 202 111 128 890
Weighted estimates based on author’s tabulations from the SCF.
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Table 4.2: Financial Shopping Habits by Personality Type
Financial Personality Type
1 2 3 4 Total
How much do you shop for credit?
Very Little 17.82 18.32 15.32 33.59 19.89
Some 37.86 41.58 39.64 41.41 39.44
A Lot 44.32 40.10 45.05 25.00 40.67
Primary Source of Credit Information
Calling Around 28.29 43.07 3.60 35.94 29.66
Media 33.41 6.44 87.39 21.88 32.36
Professionals 20.71 27.72 3.60 13.28 19.10
Friend or Relative 12.92 17.82 3.60 22.66 14.27
Does Not Borrow 4.68 4.95 1.80 6.25 4.61
How much do you shop for investment?
Very Little 22.49 23.27 28.83 57.03 28.43
Some 33.18 31.68 41.44 24.22 32.58
A Lot 44.32 45.05 29.73 18.75 38.99
Primary Source of Investment Information
Calling Around 14.25 23.27 5.41 11.72 14.83
Media 24.72 20.30 53.15 9.38 25.06
Professionals 39.42 31.19 27.93 21.09 33.48
Friend or Relative 20.71 24.75 10.81 38.28 22.92
Does Not Invest 0.89 0.50 2.70 19.53 3.71
N 449 202 111 128 890
Weighted estimates based on author’s tabulations from the SCF.
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‘personality’ types generated from the cluster analysis. And table 4.2 displays financial
shopping habit and sources of financial information by personality type.
Type 1 corresponds most closely to what is characterized in EBRI (2002) and
MacFarland et al. (2004) as a “planner” or “successful planner.” These participants have
the strongest orientation toward long-term financial planning, in general, and toward
saving for retirement, in particular. As a consequence, they are also the most secure about
their retirement savings. They also have the strongest savings habit and are the most
willing to take above average financial risks to earn above average returns. They are fairly
diligent in shopping for both credit and investments and are the most apt to rely on
financial professionals for both credit and investment decisions.
Type 2 in this analysis resembles the “up and coming planners” set forth in MacFarland
et al. (2004). Participants in this segment are focused more on the medium-term and are
somewhat less focused on saving for retirement. They are also less confident about their
retirement savings and less willing to take financial risks. Interestingly, though, this group
is somewhat more conservative in its borrowing attitudes than successful planners but
somewhat more aggressive in its attitude toward spending. That is, up and coming
planners are less keen to borrow, either for purchases in general or for luxury items in
particular, yet are more likely to agree that they would increase their spending if the value
of their assets increased. What really distinguishes the “up and coming” planners from the
more “successful” planners, however, is that they are far less likely to save regularly and,
instead, tend to save on a irregular basis. Yet these poorer habits do not appear to be
reflected in a lessened ability to save for large, future expenses, which they do just as well
as the successful planners. Credit card behaviors between these two groups are also rather
similar. Up and coming planners are similarly diligent about shopping around before
making financial decisions, though somewhat less so for credit decisions, which may be
attributable to their lower demand for credit. However, they differ from successful planners
in terms of their primary sources of financial information. Up and coming planners are
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more likely to rely on friends and relatives, and less likely to rely on media and financial
professionals.
Again invoking the EBRI (2002) typology, participants in the third segment might be
best characterized as “strugglers.” They are somewhat more likely than up and coming
planners to plan for the short-term financially, yet are very similar to this segment in terms
of the proportion of participants planning for the long-term. This segment’s focus on
saving for retirement is similar to up and coming planners, but they are considerably less
confident in the adequacy of their retirement savings. They also display a higher degree of
risk aversion, markedly poorer savings habits (including whether they are saving for a large,
future expense) and credit card behaviors. Furthermore, they are less inclined to spend out
of capital gains than up and coming planners, but are more apt to borrow for luxury
goods. They put in less effort shopping around before making investment decisions, though
this could be partly due to their lower propensity to invest. Strugglers also have a strong
tendency to rely on the media for their information on credit and investment decisions.
Participants in the fourth segments are clearly the worst off in terms of attitudes and
behaviors and, for this reason, are termed “acute strugglers.” Participants in this segment
have a decidedly short-term planning horizon, are highly risk averse financially and have,
by far, the weakest orientation toward saving for retirement. In fact, they have a markedly
higher precautionary motive. Surprisingly, though, they are not markedly less secure about
their retirement savings than the “strugglers” in the third segment. Participants in this
segment have even greater difficulty putting aside money, with nearly 70 percent reporting
that they generally do not save each month. A high proportion (nearly 43 percent) also
report not even owning a credit card; and those who do, struggle to pay off their credit
card balance each month. Acute strugglers are by far the least likely to invest, which
explains why they do little shopping for investments. And those who do invest, rely
primarily on friends and relatives. Moreover, while they are somewhat less likely to borrow
than other segments, they do decidedly less shopping for credit decisions.
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Table 4.3: Demographic Characteristics by Financial Type
Financial Type
1 2 3 4 Total
Age
Under 35 27.84 19.31 36.04 42.19 28.99
35 to 44 31.63 32.18 32.43 35.16 32.36
45 to 54 27.84 31.68 19.82 14.84 25.84
55 to 64 12.69 16.83 11.71 7.81 12.81
Ethnicity of Head
White 85.08 84.16 81.08 82.81 84.04
Black 7.57 5.45 5.41 11.72 7.42
Hispanic 3.56 2.48 6.31 3.91 3.71
Asian or Other 3.79 7.92 7.21 1.56 4.83
Educational Attainment of Head
High School or Less 19.60 19.80 31.53 42.19 24.38
Some College 21.83 17.33 34.23 32.81 23.93
Bachelor’s Degree 30.07 27.72 18.02 18.75 26.40
Advanced Degree 28.51 35.15 16.22 6.25 25.28
Marital Status
Never Married 14.03 6.93 19.82 23.44 14.49
Married 73.27 77.23 64.86 42.97 68.76
Divorced or Widowed 12.69 15.84 15.32 33.59 16.74
Typical Annual Income
1st Quartile 16.26 16.83 26.13 60.16 23.93
2nd Quartile 25.17 24.75 45.05 31.25 28.43
3rd Quartile 34.97 22.28 19.82 8.59 26.40
4th Quartile 23.61 36.14 9.01 0.00 21.24
LSD Balance-Last 5 years
Less than 5,000 20.71 20.30 29.73 49.22 25.84
5,000-19,999 22.05 23.76 31.53 36.72 25.73
20,000-99,999 30.96 24.26 24.32 13.28 26.07
More than 100,000 26.28 31.68 14.41 0.78 22.36
N 449 202 111 128 890
Weighted estimates based on author’s tabulations from the SCF.
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Table 4.3 provides a breakdown of some demographic characteristics by financial
personality type. Not unexpectedly, table 4.3 reveals a strong relationship between age and
financial type in that the “strugglers” in segments three and four are younger on average
than the “planners” in segments one and two. Interestingly, the successful planners are
younger on average than the up and coming planners. Educational attainment of the
household head is also strongly tied to financial type, with education attainment
decreasing in type.
The strugglers in segments three and four are more likely to have never been married
than participants in segments four and five. What is troubling, however, is to find such a
high proportion of widowed or divorced participants (34 percent) among the acute
strugglers.
Acute strugglers overwhelmingly fall in the first, or lowest, quartile of typical earnings
(58 percent), whereas strugglers earn slightly better, falling predominantly in the second
earnings quartile (53 percent). The income distribution is less concentrated for the up and
coming planners relative to successful planners, with a higher proportion of up and coming
planners falling in both the lowest and highest income quartiles.
A very distinct pattern emerges in the cross-tabulation of the settlement size and
financial type. Moving from successful planners (segment 1) to acute strugglers (segment
4), one observes a progressively larger proportion of smaller settlements (i.e., less than
$5,000 and between $5,000 and $19,999). The obverse pattern holds for larger settlements.
In other words, the “strugglers” tend to have lower plan balances than the “planners.”
4.2.2 Data
The SCF is a cross-sectional survey repeated every three years and contains detailed
information on households’ finances as well as a number of unique questions on financial
attitudes and behaviors. Wealthy households are oversampled in the survey, so population
weights are used to derive more representative estimates.
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The SCF began asking respondents about the receipt of cash settlements from previous
jobs as early as the 1989 interview, but a question on how those settlements were used was
not introduced until the 1998 survey.2
While respondents can provide information on up to six cash settlements–who received
each, when and in what amount–, the question on how these settlements were used is a
general one that does not refer to any one specific settlement (if multiple settlements were
reported). Consequently, a one-to-one match of each cash settlement to its disposition
cannot be established in cases where respondents reported more than one settlement and
more than one use.
My unit of observation is therefore any cash settlements reported within four years of
the interview. If a household reported more than one settlement and more than one use for
its settlements, the additional restriction is imposed that their first settlement had to have
occurred within four years from the interview date. This is to ensure that the disposition
outcomes households reported actually occurred in the four year period of this study.
Another drawback of the SCF question on cash settlements from previous jobs is that
the first question in this series refers specifically to “cash settlements received from a
pension or retirement plan of a previous job” and thus may be missing workers who simply
left their plan with their former employer. As a consequence, the results may overstate the
rate at which workers cash out their retirement plan balances. A final issue with the SCF
data is that, because it is a repeated cross-section, some of the variables used in the
analysis are not measured prior to the receipt of the cash settlement(s). To mitigate this
problem I have restricted the sample to settlements that occurred in reasonable proximity
to each interview.3 Of course, this does not completely resolve the problem, so that,
ultimately, some of the relationships in the multivariate analysis cannot necessarily be
2The SCF has not been used to rigorously study pre-retirement withdrawals from employer-sponsored
retirement plans Munnell and Sundee´n (2004) use the 2001 survey to generate some descriptive statistics on
the incidence and size of lump-sum distributions and the income and age of those who take these distributions.
3The need for proximity to the interview had to be weighed against the need to generate a reasonable
sample size.
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interpreted as strictly causal.
The sample is composed of households whose heads are under 65 years of age, who have
previously worked full-time and who, if not working full-time at the time of the interview,
intend to return to full-time work. These cuts attempt to ensure that the sample is limited
to workers who have not dropped out of the labor force. Also omitted from the sample are
workers with less than five years of full-time work experience, if not working or only
working part-time at the time of interview, or with less than three years of full-time
experience, if working full-time at the time of interview. 4
4.2.3 Estimation
This study analyzes both the primary decision to cash out or roll over a settlement as well
as more specific uses of cash settlements. The SCF question on households’ use of their
settlements has evolved with each survey, adding more detailed to the menu of options.5
To maintain consistency across surveys, I have collapsed the various uses of a cash out into
three categories: 1) other investments (outside of another employer-sponsored retirement
plan or IRA); 2) paying off bills, debts or living expenses; and 3) spending on durables or
other purchases.
Table 4.1 presents the breakdown of disposition choices by financial types. The
proportion of participants cashing out at least some portion of their plan steadily increases
in financial type, with 36 percent of successful planners (type 1) and 77 percent of acute
strugglers (type 4). In general, the same pattern holds with respect to using settlements to
pay off bills or for other spending, with the exception that successful planners (type 1) are
slightly more likely to pay off bills than up and coming planners (type 2). This may be a
result, for instance, of succesful planners’ somewhat more favorable attitudes toward
borrowing. No clear pattern emerges, by contrast, with respect to investing one’s
4This cut was dictated by the fact the SCF does not collect some key employment history information,
such as occupation and industry, from respondents who do not meet these criteria.
5However, the more specific uses introduced in later surveys generated very few responses.
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Table 4.4: Disposition Choices by Financial Type
Financial Personality Type
1 2 3 4 Total
Disposition of Settlement
Cashed Out None 70.38 67.82 45.05 21.88 59.66
Cashed Out Some 29.62 32.18 54.95 78.13 40.34
Other Investment
None 91.09 88.12 93.69 90.63 90.67
Some 8.91 11.88 6.31 9.38 9.33
Paid Off Bills
None 91.09 93.56 80.18 72.66 87.64
Some 8.91 6.44 19.82 27.34 12.36
Spent
None 86.41 84.65 71.17 57.03 79.89
Some 13.59 15.35 28.83 42.97 20.11
N 449 202 111 128 890
Weighted estimates based on author’s tabulations from the SCF.
settlement, other than that up and coming planners (type 2) are the most, and strugglers
(type 3) the least, likely to re-invest their settlements into other, non-tax-qualified
instruments.
The first model evaluates the probability that a households takes any money from their
employer-sponsored retirement plans.
CashOut =
 = 1 if any money taken from plan(s)= 0 if no money taken from plan(s)
Pr(CashOut = 1) = Φ(β′X + γ′Income+ δ′Liquidity + µ′Health+
θ′Expect+ α′Type)
In this model, Φ denotes the cumulative normal probability function. It controls for the
determinants of household savings behavior present in the life-cycle model: a measure of
household income, age and other demographic characteristics of the household, such as the
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the number of dependents in the household, race, education and marital status. Plan
characteristics include the total value of cash settlements taken over the previous four
years and the total number of cash settlements from an employer’s plan ever received. The
vector X captures these demographic, job and plan characteristics. Income is a vector of
variables that includes the household’s self-reported “usual” income as well as indicator
variables for growth in real income over the past five years, expectations of real income
growth in the coming year and typical certainty over next year’s income. Liquidity is a
vectors that contains both measures of households’ liquid asset holdings and their
borrowing constraints. Health denotes a vector of variables related to the health of the
household’s head (and spouse/partner) and whether the head smokes. Expect is a vector
of subjective expectations related to the household head’s retirement and longevity.
Finally, Type is a vector that captures the financial personality types generated by the
cluster analysis.
Income Despite providing some information on households’ employment history, the
SCF does not permit the researcher to determine in a definitive way households’ income at
the time of job separation.6 I employ instead what households report as their “usual”
income.7 This particular definition of income could be considered a rough approximation of
households’ permanent income.
The SCF also provides information on households’ past and (expected) future income
trends. First, households are asked to indicate whether their income grew faster or slower
than inflation over the last five years. Households that experienced a decline in real income
over the previous five years may, as a result of their poor income growth, have incurred
debt to smooth consumption or may have pent up demand for large purchases. Hence,
6The employment history module only provides earnings for respondents’ longest held job prior to their
current one.
7To be more precise, the SCF asks if respondents’ income in the year prior to the interview was usually
high or low and, if it was, what their usual income was. Hence, the income measure used here will be equal
to the households’ income in the year prior to the interview if that income was not unusually high or low.
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these households might be more apt to use their cash settlement to pay off debt or for
consumption.
As a measure of income uncertainty, households are also asked if they are usually certain
about their income in the coming year. Households that are typically less certain about
their income might also be expected to behave as precautionary savers; that is, they might
seek greater liquidity or they might need to pay off debt incurred from past shocks. Or,
being exposed to general income uncertainty over a number of years, they may have
accumulated sufficient precautionary savings so that they have no need to cash out their
settlement. Lastly, households are asked to report whether they expect a growth, decline
or no change in their real income in the coming year. In general, households that expect
adverse income trends would not be well served to spend their settlement.
Liquidity and Borrowing Constraints Households are defined as credit constrained if
in the past five years they had a credit application denied, did not receive as much as
requested or were discouraged from applying. A separate group was classified as
non-applicants if they did not request credit in the past five years, but not because they
thought they would be turned down. Households that have not been able to acquire the
amount of credit they desire may well tap their retirement savings to meet this unsatisfied
demand.
Households’ holdings of liquid assets are also included in the model, despite the fact that
these measures reflect holdings after the disposition of cash settlements. The resulting
endogeneity of the liquid asset measure is somewhat mitigated by use of quartile
categories. That is, the incidence of households moving into a different quartile since their
cash settlement should be relatively low. Liquid assets include the value of money in
checking and savings accounts, certificates of deposit and money market mutual funds.
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Health Variables To measure health status I include an indicator variable for whether
the head of the household or the spouse/partner are in either poor or fair health. As
another measure of health I include an indicator variable for whether the respondent
smokes. Smoking may be related not only to health status (and longevity) but also to
individuals’ rates of time preference and other behavioral factors. For instance, smoking
may signal a high discount rate as well as problems with self-control, each of which are
likely associated with a higher risk of cashing out.
Subjective Expectations An innovation in the SCF compared to most other national
surveys is the range of subjective expectations collected from respondents.8 Two questions
pertinent to retirement planning concern how long respondents expect to live and how long
they expect to work.9
Unlike DB plans, which are required by law to provide participants with lifetime
annuities, DC plans typically offer only a lump-sum distribution option at retirement
(workers can, of course, subsequently purchase an annuity). Therefore, DC plan owners
face a greater risk of outliving their savings and, consequently, should take into account
their longevity expectations when determining how much they will need to save for
retirement.
In general, respondents who expect to live longer should also anticipate a longer
retirement. Therefore, individuals who are optimistic about their longevity ought to place
a higher value on building their retirement nest egg. The same line of reasoning would
suggest that those who intend to retire earlier would also need more savings to finance a
longer retirement, unless of course they also expect to die early. However, it may also be
that individuals plan to retire early because they believe that they will be financially
8Many of the questions are quite similar to those found in the Health and Retirement Study, which tracks
an older cohort than the SCF.
9Evidence from the HRS has shown that these subjective longevity forecasts are, in general, remarkably
accurate (Hurd and McGarry, 1997). One key difference, however, is that the SCF samples younger cohorts,
whose longer-term forecasts may be less accurate.
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secure enough to do so, while those who plan to delay retirement believe they must do so
because they have not saved adequately.
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Table 4.5: Marginal Probit Estimates of Taking Any Cash Settlement
Uses of Cash Out
Cash Out Invest Pay Bills Spent
Female Head (d) −0.026 −0.047∗∗ 0.014 0.046
(0.080) (0.019) (0.037) (0.054)
Married (d) −0.13∗ −0.026 −0.056 0.0043
(0.070) (0.028) (0.040) (0.046)
Black (d) 0.18∗∗ −0.0042 −0.014 0.090
(0.080) (0.029) (0.033) (0.059)
Hispanic (d) 0.10 −0.012 0.067 0.031
(0.11) (0.036) (0.069) (0.082)
Age: 35-44 (d) 0.033 0.015 0.057∗ −0.050
(0.061) (0.026) (0.033) (0.036)
Age: 45-54 (d) 0.038 0.026 0.095∗∗ −0.092∗∗
(0.075) (0.034) (0.048) (0.038)
Age: 55-64 (d) −0.14 0.039 0.080 −0.19∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.057) (0.074) (0.027)
Total Number of Dependents 0.046∗∗ −0.0020 0.010 0.028∗∗
(0.022) (0.0087) (0.011) (0.014)
Rents Home (d) 0.14∗∗ −0.0055 0.058∗ 0.076∗
(0.058) (0.023) (0.033) (0.043)
One Prior Settlement (d) −0.024 −0.023 −0.016 0.021
(0.059) (0.020) (0.025) (0.044)
More than One Prior Settlement (d) 0.065 −0.050∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.022) (0.025) (0.096)
Less than High School (d) −0.020 −0.044∗ 0.053 0.017
(0.13) (0.022) (0.072) (0.085)
Some College (d) 0.017 −0.043∗∗ 0.032 0.0032
(0.066) (0.021) (0.033) (0.042)
Bachelor Degree (d) −0.061 −0.031 0.017 −0.074∗
(0.076) (0.025) (0.042) (0.041)
Advanced Degree (d) −0.12 −0.044∗∗ 0.11∗ −0.16∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.022) (0.060) (0.032)
Usual Income: Q1 (d) −0.17 0.023 −0.047 −0.071
(0.12) (0.055) (0.056) (0.090)
Usual Income: Q2 (d) −0.14 −0.030 0.0022 −0.041
(0.11) (0.042) (0.060) (0.091)
Usual Income: Q3 (d) −0.074 −0.0057 0.033 −0.034
(0.097) (0.036) (0.062) (0.085)
Real Income Decline (d) 0.036 −0.038∗ 0.038 0.027
(0.060) (0.022) (0.033) (0.039)
Real Income Growth(d) 0.019 −0.014 0.027 −0.0070
(0.059) (0.023) (0.033) (0.043)
Income Usually Uncertain (d) 0.020 0.00033 −0.052∗∗ 0.065
Continued on next page
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Table 4.5 – continued from previous page
Uses of Cash Out
Cash Out Invest Pay Bills Spent
(0.058) (0.022) (0.022) (0.041)
Expects Real Income Growth (d) −0.13∗∗ 0.013 −0.060∗∗∗ −0.054
(0.055) (0.025) (0.023) (0.035)
Expects Real Income Decline (d) −0.094 −0.0056 0.028 −0.097∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.025) (0.033) (0.034)
ln(LSD) −0.080∗∗∗ −0.0065 −0.0019 −0.050∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.0074) (0.0075) (0.012)
Fair or Poor Health (d) 0.10 0.0077 0.039 0.029
(0.065) (0.024) (0.033) (0.045)
Head smokes (d) 0.10∗ 0.038 0.011 −0.0066
(0.061) (0.028) (0.030) (0.038)
Longevity: 70 to 80 years old (d) −0.061 −0.014 0.031 −0.070
(0.078) (0.025) (0.042) (0.046)
Longevity: 80 to 90 years old (d) −0.057 −0.045∗∗ 0.0084 −0.026
(0.068) (0.022) (0.034) (0.043)
Longevity: more than 90 years old (d) 0.14∗ 0.0044 0.052 0.032
(0.073) (0.029) (0.046) (0.052)
Stop Full-Time Work: after age 65 (d) 0.060 −0.0060 0.0051 0.031
(0.057) (0.021) (0.026) (0.039)
Stop Full-Time Work: before age 62 (d) 0.068 0.025 −0.013 0.046
(0.058) (0.025) (0.029) (0.042)
Liq Assets: Q1 (d) 0.35∗∗∗ 0.018 0.22∗∗∗ 0.21∗
(0.10) (0.046) (0.081) (0.11)
Liq Assets: Q2 (d) 0.27∗∗∗ 0.023 0.13∗ 0.23∗∗
(0.097) (0.041) (0.073) (0.11)
Liq Assets: Q3 (d) 0.11 0.044 −0.00064 0.14
(0.098) (0.046) (0.057) (0.11)
Credit Constrained (d) 0.058 −0.0057 0.0072 0.015
(0.072) (0.025) (0.030) (0.043)
No Credit Requests (d) 0.030 0.026 −0.029 0.026
(0.079) (0.037) (0.033) (0.060)
Up & Coming Planners (d) 0.049 0.016 −0.029 0.071
(0.067) (0.025) (0.030) (0.054)
Strugglers (d) 0.17∗∗ −0.019 0.049 0.11∗∗
(0.072) (0.026) (0.041) (0.058)
Acute Strugglers (d) 0.21∗∗∗ −0.019 0.049 0.11∗∗
(0.070) (0.025) (0.040) (0.056)
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 890 890 890 890
Log Likelihood −424.7 −245.6 −298.6 −379.1
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01; (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
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Table 4.5 presents the marginal effects from a probit model of the disposition choice.
The first column displays the model for cashing out any portion of one’s plan. As
previously mentioned, the sample for this model is restricted to cash settlements occurring
within four years of the interview.
Among the financial personality types–the key variables of interest–, acute strugglers
(type 4) were 20 percent more likely to cash out than successful planners (type 1).
Strugglers (type 3) are also significantly more likely to cash out. As expected, the
magnitude of this effect, and statistical significance ,is slightly diminished relative to acute
strugglers. The coefficient on up and coming planners is positive but not significant. The
results from the probit model confirm that, relative to the successful planners (type 1), the
two struggler types (3 and 4) are indeed at considerably greater risk of depleting their
employer-sponsored retirement savings at job separation.
Rather surprisingly, very few of the general demographic characteristics are statistically
significant, which may be attributable to the unusually rich array of variables in the model
reflecting household preferences. However, a rather stark result emerges with respect to
race; namely, a household in which the head is black is 18 percentage points more likely to
cash out than one in which the head is white. Another notable result is that neither
education nor income are significant in this model. In fact, the coefficients on the quartiles
of income are negative. Part of this may be attributable to the somewhat unconventional
definition of household income employed in this study. However, results from more
parsimonious models (not shown here) reveal that it is indeed the inclusion of other
variables in the model, particularly education, that absorbs much of the effect, and
eventually reverses the sign, of the income variables. Thus it is important to bear in mind
the ceteris paribus interpretation of these variables.
More dependents in the household and renting one’s home were also associated with a
significantly greater likelihood of cashing out. Married households, on the other, were less
likely to cash out relative to never married, divorced and widowed households. Finally, the
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expected inverse, and highly significant, relationship to the cash out probability obtains for
the size of settlements.
Past real income movements and typical uncertainty about next year’s income had no
significant relationship with the cash out probability. An expectation of real income
growth in the coming year, however, decreased the probability of cash out. Indeed,
households anticipating favorable income movements should have less need to tap their
retirement savings. The coefficient on the expectation of a real income decline was also
negative, but not significant.
Households in which the head smokes were more likely to cash out; smoking raises the
probability of a cash out by more than ten percentage points. It should be noted that this
significant effect obtains even with controls in the model for health status (of the head and
spouse), expected longevity (of the head), and a proxy for the household’s rate of time
preference–all variables thought to be correlated with the decision to smoke. And, as
previously noted, the effect for smoking may also reflect behavioral factors not explicitly
captured in the model such as self-control.
Households in which the head expects to live to between 70 and 80 years of age or
between 80 and 90 years of age were not significantly less likely to cash out than those who
did not expect to reach age 70 (though the coefficients on these variables were negative).
And those who expect to live the longest–beyond 90 years of age–are actually significantly
more likely to cash out than those who do not expect to live to 70. At first blush, this
result may seem difficult to reconcile with the a prior expectation that those who
anticipate living the longest should be the least inclined to cash out. But upon closer
inspection, the greater propensity of respondents who report a very long life expectancy to
cash out may actually have a psychological basis. Because retirement planning can evoke
thoughts of aging and, ultimately, of one’s own demise, it may generate the same negative
affect in individuals as questions eliciting a forecast of their lifespan. As Mitchell and Utkus
(2004) note, “being good at retirement savings requires an accurate estimate of uncertain
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future processes,” including health and longevity. Consequently, respondents who provided
answers more in line with typical longevity expectations may also be better retirement
planners than those who believed they would live to a very old–perhaps unrealistically
old–age (a fair number of respondents believed they would live to 100 or more).
Liquid asset holding were significantly, and strongly, related to the cash out probability
and exhibited the expected sign and pattern, with lower-asset households more likely to
cash out. Households who were either turned down, or discouraged from applying, for
credit in the past five years were not significantly more likely to cash out.10
4.2.4 Specific Uses of Cash Settlements
Probit Models In addition to the cash out equation, table 4.5 also display the results of
separate probit models of specific uses. The three uses of a settlement include investing it
(in a non-tax-qualified vehicle), putting it toward the payment of bills or other debt, or
spending it (on durables or other consumer items). The dependent variable in each of the
three separate probit models are defined as follows:
Invest =
 = 1 if any money was invested outside of plan(s)= 0 if no money was invested outside of plan
Pay Bills =
 = 1 if any money was used to pay of bills, debt or other expenses= 0 if no money was used to pay of bills, debt or other expenses
10Scherpf (2009), for instance, found a significant positive effect on the cash out probability for borrowing
constraints using the nearly identical in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. Accounting for
this differences might be not only the different samples but also the richer set of covariates for financial
attitudes and subjective expectations.
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Spent =
 = 1 if any money was spent on durables and other consumption= 0 if no money was spent on durables and other consumption
Hence, in each column what is being evaluated is the probability that households used
any portion of a settlement for a given purpose relative to all of the other uses (including a
rollover). The estimates reported are again the marginal effects of a probit model.
Investigating the uses of cash outs sheds additional light on households’ motivation for
taking a premature withdrawal and also permits the researcher to better evaluate the
rationality of a cash out. For instance, investing a settlement outside of a retirement plan
is generally viewed more favorably than simply consuming it. However, because in most
cases investing a settlement still entails a tax penalty, it is not always clear whether such a
portfolio reallocation is an optimal decision. More detailed information on the types of
investments chosen would be desirable. For instance, settlements used to finance an
education or start a business may well be worth the penalty for early withdrawal (and the
other costs associated with a withdrawal). Movements into other financial investments are
more difficult to justify, at least based solely on returns to investment. However, households
may desire such a portfolio reallocation not necessarily to maximize their returns but to
satisfy a need for greater liquidity. Perhaps the most easily justified use of a cash out is to
pay down unsecured debt, particularly high-interest credit card debt, since in many cases
the cost of carrying such debt will exceed that of a cash out. One general observation at
the outset is that the models of specific uses appear to explain less of the variation in
disposition choices than the model of the more general cash out/rollover decision.
With respect to the financial personality types, both “strugglers” (types 3 and 4) were
significantly more likely to spend their settlements than planners. No significant effects for
investing or paying off bills obtained for these personality types.
As in the general cash out model, there are few significant demographic variables. The
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exceptions are the effects for females, who are significantly less likely to invest their
settlement, and for older households, which are more likely to use their settlement to pay
bills but less likely to spend it. The models of specific uses do yield strong effects, however
for households who have received more than one prior settlement. These households are
significantly less likely to use their settlement for investments or paying off bills, but they
are much more likely to spend their settlement. This latter effect is quite strong and highly
significant. This may provide some indication that taking a settlement for consumption
purposes becomes something of a habit for certain households.
An additional dependent increases the probability of a cash out by about three
percentage points. Participants with a college degree (either a bachelor’s or an advanced
degree) are less likely to use their settlement for consumption. This is perhaps some
indication that better educated workers–even in the general sense–are better able to avoid
what is generally regarded as the least desirable use of a cash settlement.
Interestingly, households with uncertain earnings are significantly less likely to use their
settlement to pay off bills, as are those who expect real earnings growth. It was speculated
that because of their uncertain income these households may have incurred more debt or
other expenses, which a cash settlement could have helped to to pay off. It is possible,
then, that, facing an uncertain income stream, these households cut consumption to build
up precautionary savings. An encouraging finding with respect to anticipated income is
that households that expect a decline in real income are significantly less likely to spend
their settlement. Households with low liquid asset holdings (i.e., those in the first and
second quartiles) are more likely to use their cash settlement both for paying off bills and
consumption.
Multinomial Logit Model Specific uses of cash settlements are also investigated by
estimating a multinomial logit model. A key difference between this model and the
separate probit models estimated in table 4.6 is that here each coefficient is interpreted as
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the relative odds of using the settlement for the indicated purpose relative only to the
reference category, which in this case is a rollover.11 Finally, I should note that the choice
of a multinomial logit–as opposed to, say, a conditional or nested logit–specification was
dictated by the lack of obvious alternative-specific regressors. One other difficulty with
estimating a multinomial model lies in accounting for multiple reported uses of
settlements. Rather than creating a dependent variable with more than three (mutually
exclusive) outcomes to reflect mixed use of settlements, I have opted to code all outcomes
as “spent” if any spending was reported, “other investments” if any portion of a settlement
was invested but not spent, “pay bills” if any portion of a settlement was put to this use
but not spent or invested. Besides ensuring mutually exclusive categories, the rationale for
constructing the dependent variable in this fashion lies in the perceived ‘rational hierarchy’
of uses for settlements.
Table 4.6: Multinomial Logit Estimates of Cash Out Uses
Disposition
Invest Pay Bills Spend
Expects Real Income Growth 0.890 0.366∗∗∗ 0.568∗
(0.390) (0.137) (0.164)
Expects Real Income Decline 0.907 0.893 0.436∗∗
(0.433) (0.355) (0.147)
Up & Coming Planners 1.421 0.542 1.408
(0.576) (0.261) (0.527)
Strugglers 1.235 1.968 2.443∗∗
(0.729) (0.842) (0.923)
Acute Strugglers 1.915 2.624∗∗ 3.074∗∗∗
(1.023) (1.145) (1.177)
N 890
Log Likelihood −758.7
Robust standard errors in parentheses; exponentiated coefficients; ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
Table 4.6 displays the results from the multinomial logit estimation for financial
personality types. By and large, the multinomial logit model confirms the results of the
11In the separate probit models the coefficients were to be interpreted relative to all other uses, not just
a rollover.
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probit models. It does, however, bring out a greater distinction between strugglers and
acute strugglers in terms of their propensity to use their cash settlements for specific
purposes. In particular, acute strugglers are at higher risk of using a settlement for all
three uses relative to rolling it over. For instance, they are nearly three times as likely as
successful planners to spend their settlement as they are to roll it over. Another
multinomial logit model also indicates that acute struggles are at significantly higher risk
of using their settlement to pay off bills, whereas in the probit the only significant effect for
a specific use obtained for spending. This is a somewhat more encouraging result, since it
indicates that cash outs by acute strugglers are not driven primarily by current
consumption.
4.3 Conclusion and Discussion
With participant-directed DC plans increasingly supplanting, rather than supplementing,
DB plans, workers have had to assume greater responsibility–and risk–for managing their
retirement savings and planning for retirement. As a result, there has been growing
concern about how well workers are able to cope with this increased decision-making
responsibility. One of the key decisions that DC plan participants will face is how to
dispose of their plan assets when leaving their employer. Participants have been thought to
be particularly vulnerable to committing ‘mistakes’ here because the disposition choices in
these plans have generally not encouraged workers to keep money in tax-deferred accounts.
This study has examined how the heterogeneity in participants’ financial attitudes and
behaviors is related to their decision on whether to take money from their plans at job
separation and what they do with that money if they do take a withdrawal.
Cluster analysis was used to generate four attitudinal and behavioral segments of
participants. The first, and largest, segment exhibited attitudes and behaviors that
appeared to be consistent with the successful planner type envisioned by retirement
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planning experts. The other three segments progressively diverged from this first type.
Probit models confirmed that these other three segments were increasingly likely to cash
out at job separation, although only the effects of the last two “struggler” segments were
statistically significant.
An encouraging result from this study is that about half of the participants in this
sample were classified in the “successful planner” segment, exhibiting desirable attitudes
and behaviors and cashing out at a low rate. Roughly another quarter fell into the up and
coming planner segment (type 2) that still exhibited fairly strong attitudes and behaviors
and were not significantly more likely to cash out than Type 1 planners in the multivariate
analysis. On the other hand, just over one-quarter of participants exhibited attitudes and
behaviors that diverged significantly form this planner type, and these differences are
reflected in a significantly higher probability of cashing out and, more specifically, of
spending their settlement. It is also somewhat notable that significant effects on the cash
out probability should be obtained for financial type variables in a model controlling for
typical determinants of life-cycle savings, income uncertainty, asset holdings and subjective
expectations.
The results in this study raise some concerns over how well “struggler” types served by
DC plans if the likelihood is high that they will deplete a substantial portion before
reaching retirement. For financial educators and employers alike, these results point to the
need to identify groups of participants who are at particular risk for depleting their
account balances at job separation and how to provide them with the information and
education that might have them conform more to the “planner” model. This need has been
particularly acute in the absence of a strong default options that encourage workers to save
their cash settlements. The recent mandate for employers to roll over balances less than
$5,000 and greater than $1,000 is a positive step in this direction.
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